PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT

INTEGRITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

ENFORCEMENT OF NARCOTICS LAWS

July 2002

Ellen Green-Ceisler

Director, Integrity & Accountability Office

Author

TABLE OF CONTENTS

 

 

 

   SUBJECT                                                                                  PAGE

 

OVERVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .         1

 

BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .     3

 

                The Integrity and Accountability Office  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3

 

                Basis for Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

 

                Aftermath of the 39th District Scandal  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                 7

 

                Narcotics Bureau Mission and Organizational Structure . . . 8

 

 

TRENDS AND PATTERNS IN EXISTING DATA . . . . . . . . .                 10

 

                Information Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   10

 

                Litigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                 10

 

                                Interpretation and Analysis of Litigation Data . . . .             14

 

                IAB Investigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                 15

 

                                Analysis of IAB Data           . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ……….   17

 

                Use of Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                 20

 

                Court Attendance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                24

 

                Narcotics Arrests Dispositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .             25

 

                Departmental Studies and Audits of Narcotics Operations .                 30

 

Integrity Control Office – Narcotics Bureau . . . . . .                31

 

                                Integrity Control Unit – Internal Affairs Bureau. . .                 32

 

                                Quality Assurance Bureau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                34

 

                                Drug Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .       34

 

                                Summary Analysis of Information Sources . . . . . . . . . …          35

 

NARCOTICS BUREAU PERSONNEL AND MANAGEMENT 

                POLICIES, PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . .                36

 

                Personnel Selection Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ……        36

 

                Narcotics Enforcement Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . …            39

 

                Transfer Policies, Practices and Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . .                ……                40

 

                                Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .         ….                42

 

                Supervisory Oversight and Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                         42

 

                Discipline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                47

 

                Evidence Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                 50

               

                               

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                53

 

                CI’s and Controlled Narcotics Buys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .           56

 

 

THE ENFORCEMENT OF NARCOTICS LAWS AND

                CIVIL RIGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                57

 

 

 

         OVERVIEW

 

 

                This study by the Integrity and Accountability Office examines the policies and practices of the narcotics enforcement operations of the Philadelphia Police Department to insure that these efforts are conducted legally, ethically, and within Departmental guidelines.  In light of the vastly increased drug enforcement operations undertaken by the Department over the past five years, a comprehensive examination and assessment of the integrity and effectiveness of these efforts is timely and necessary.

 

The IAO’s review and analysis of a variety of objective information sources indicates that the Department’s narcotics enforcement operations are largely conducted within the boundaries established by law and Departmental policies – as it relates to serious corruption and excessive force.  However, the IAO identified important policy, operational, and management weaknesses that have created conditions conducive to breeding corruption and decreasing the detection of misconduct or corruption.

 

Based on the findings of this study, the Department is in the process of implementing certain policies and practices to remedy some of the problems most directly under its control. These remedial measures, which are in their initial stages, have been incorporated into this Report. It is not reasonable to speculate as to the future impact of these changes and subsequent follow-up will be necessary to evaluate their effectiveness.   Other problems identified in this Report have labor and/or budgetary implications, or require the cooperation and coordination of other governmental agencies, and are therefore not conducive to easy or quick resolution.

 

The following is a brief synopsis of the IAO’s findings.  The factual bases for these general statements are detailed in the body of the report:

 

1.      The Philadelphia Police Department does not collect some critical

information that would enable it to monitor the integrity and effectiveness of its narcotics enforcement operations.  Some relevant information/data that is collected is not consistently and effectively utilized by the Department.

 

2.      The Department’s internal auditing functions of narcotics enforcement

operations are sporadic and at times ineffective.    In some instances, the Department did not take appropriate steps to rectify problems identified in audits that had been conducted.  The Department lacks established and enforceable policies and protocols regarding management obligations and responses to internal audits and investigations, particularly those in which problems are noted.

 

3.  The Narcotics Bureau personnel selection process is inadequate and ineffective, increasing the likelihood that officers ill suited for these duties are assigned to narcotics enforcement operations.   Considering the numerous opportunities for corruption that exist in narcotics enforcement, it is imperative that officers and supervisors assigned to the Narcotics Bureau undergo a rigorous screening process to ensure a proven track record of integrity. 

 

4.       Officer training in critical aspects of narcotics law enforcement is

 inconsistent and sporadic.

 

5.      Narcotics Bureau supervisors are not consistently experienced, screened,

trained, evaluated, monitored, held accountable, disciplined, or afforded appropriate resources with which to effectively fulfill their duties.  These problems raise questions regarding the effectiveness of supervisory oversight in narcotics enforcement operations which is a critical component in ensuring the integrity of such corruption prone operations.

 

6.      Systematic transfers and rotations of narcotics officers and supervisors

do not occur which raises potentially serious integrity problems.  It is critical that term limits be initiated and enforced on a regular basis.

 

7.      Disciplinary practices in the Narcotics Bureau are lax and inconsistent.

 

8.      The Narcotics Bureau does not strictly enforce or monitor compliance

with applicable Department regulations regarding the handling of evidence seized in narcotics investigations.

 

9.  Prior to the recent implementation of remedial procedures, supervision and monitoring of confidential informants has been marginal.  It is too early to determine the effectiveness of  these changes.

 

            10.   There are a variety of conditions that may encourage narcotics officers to “cut constitutional corners” in the enforcement of narcotics laws.   Such factors include the following:

·        Narcotics officers receive compensation and other considerations based on their activity/arrest statistics.

·        Inefficiencies and inequities in the Department and criminal justice system as a whole adversely impact officer morale and their commitment to organizational and legal standards.

·        Extreme and unrealistic pressures are placed on officers to “solve” the drug problem.

·        Officers receive inadequate training as to the applicable legal standards.

·        Enforcement of  the Department’s policies created to ensure that citizens’ civil rights are protected is not consistent.

 

 

 

 

 

BACKGROUND

 

In the late 1980’s a squad of 39th District police officers responsible for enforcing narcotics laws systematically violated citizens civil rights, stole money and drugs, planted evidence on suspects, fabricated the legal basis for search and seizure warrants, committed perjury, and used excessive force on suspects.

 

The revelations of this ongoing corruption erupted into one of the most damaging scandals in the history of the Philadelphia Police Department.  In 1995, six 39th District officers were jailed.  Several hundred criminal convictions resulting from these officer’s activities were overturned and thousands more scrutinized.  Millions of dollars were spent settling civil rights lawsuits stemming from these unlawful activities.  Intense media coverage of this scandal severely eroded public confidence in the integrity of its police force and hindered law enforcement and prosecution efforts in the city. 

 

The repercussions of the 39th District scandal persist. The city continues to settle civil rights lawsuits initiated as a result of the corrupt actions of the 39th District officers, prior criminal convictions involving these officers continue to be scrutinized and challenged, and residual public wariness of the integrity of its police force still exists.

 

In the aftermath of the 39th District scandal, in 1996 the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and the Police-Barrio Relations Project filed a lawsuit in federal court alleging that widespread and pervasive systemic deficiencies in the Philadelphia Police Department contributed to the ongoing cycle of scandals that plagued the Department.

 

Rather than litigate, the City of Philadelphia entered into a Settlement Agreement with the Plaintiffs that set forth a comprehensive plan for reform in the Philadelphia Police Department.  The goal of this Agreement is to minimize and deter police corruption and misconduct to the greatest extent possible, and thereby enhance public confidence in the Philadelphia Police Department.

 

 

The Integrity and Accountability Office

 

To assist in meeting this goal, the Agreement created a permanent Integrity & Accountability Office  to monitor and audit Departmental policies, practices, and operations as they relate to the detection and control of misconduct and corruption in the Department and if necessary, to make recommendations for change.  In order to effectuate the broad duties of the Office, the IAO at its discretion, can initiate studies and audits, has access to virtually all Department records and personnel, and can make its findings public.

 

Since its inception, the IAO has had the access and independence necessary to carry out its responsibilities, has released several reports covering a broad range of issues, and has presented recommendations – some of which have been implemented by the Police Department.

 

By virtue of its essential function to monitor and audit the Police Department, and in order to remain effective and credible, the IAO must exercise independent judgment in reporting findings and making recommendations.  This independence also means that the IAO analyses, critiques, and recommendations are solely those of the IAO.  This report should not be interpreted as expressing the policies or positions of the government of the City of Philadelphia, or the opinions, views or beliefs of the Mayor, the Police Commissioner, the City Solicitor, or any other official of the City of Philadelphia.

 

Section VI of the Settlement Agreement charges the IAO with oversight and auditing functions related to the Department’s narcotics enforcement operations. (See Appendix A).  Particular emphasis on oversight of this area of law enforcement is based on a broad range of misconduct that has historically been associated with narcotics enforcement including, but not limited to, violating civil rights, theft, excessive force, drug use, perjury, planting evidence, accepting bribes, cooperating with drug dealers, or violating any number of Departmental directives and policies* 

 

To fulfill the mandate of the Settlement Agreement the IAO spent much of the past year (in conjunction with its other ongoing monitoring functions) conducting a comprehensive audit and assessment of the policies, practices, and operations of the Narcotics Bureau** and other interrelated units of the Philadelphia Police Department.  This report presents the findings and recommendations pertaining to that study.

_________________

*The 39th District scandal was only one of several scandals arising from the enforcement of narcotics laws.  In 1989, officers from the Department’s elite 5-Squad narcotics unit were involved in widespread theft of money and drugs and extortion.  Four 5-Squad officers were eventually convicted of federal racketeering and conspiracy charges.

 

**After the 39th District scandal, individual districts were banned from enforcing narcotics laws.  In 1999, the Department re-established district level enforcement of narcotics laws through Narcotics Enforcement Teams (NETS) which are comprised of approximately five to seven officers and a supervisor who focus on open street sales.  NETS are not authorized to conduct long-term drug investigations, utilize search and seizure warrants or confidential informants, conduct direct buys or reversal stings or other more complex investigative techniques such as those used in the Narcotics Bureau.

 

The original scope of this audit included NETS operations.  As this project progressed, however, it became apparent that the scope of the study was unwieldy in light of IAO resources.   The IAO’s  preliminary findings, along with its ongoing monitoring of Internal Affairs investigations, identified problems related to record keeping practices and other integrity issues with some district NETS.  The IAO intends to conduct a separate in-depth study of district NETS operations.

 

Basis for Findings

 

The findings and recommendations contained in this report are based upon the IAO’s review and analysis of the following:

 

1.      Written Departmental policies and directives which guide the Narcotics Bureau operations;

 

2.      Departmental policies and practices related to the personnel selection process for the Narcotics Bureau, and review of the Internal Affairs Bureau (“IAB”), discipline, and other pertinent employment records of Narcotics Bureau personnel; 

 

3.      Training provided to Narcotics Bureau personnel;

 

4.      All completed IAB investigations generated as a result of Narcotics Bureau activities from 1997 through July 1, 2002;

 

5.      Review of all internally generated audits and reports and other internal Departmental monitoring practices related to narcotics enforcement activities since 1997 that the IAO was able to identify.

 

6.      Narcotics Bureau supervisory oversight policies and practices;

 

7.      Internal Affairs use of force and firearms discharge databases for all reported force incidents generated as a result of Narcotics Bureau activities from January 1, 1997 to May, 2002;

 

8.      Disciplinary actions initiated against Narcotics Bureau personnel in general, and specifically in cases where the IAB investigations sustained allegations of misconduct;

 

9.      Lawsuits generated as a result of narcotics enforcement activities from January 1, 1993 to July 1, 2002;

 

10.  Review of databases maintained by the Narcotics Bureau Management Information Systems Unit;

 

11.  Review of the operations, databases, and reports of the Narcotics Bureau Integrity Control Office (ICO) including the confidential informant and search warrant databases, and the annual ICO search and seizure warrant reports from January 1, 1998 to December 31, 2001;

 

 

12.  Review of approximately two hundred and fifty search and seizure warrants and supporting affidavits of probable cause executed in 1999, 2000, and 2001 by the Narcotics Field Units;

 

13.  Records of targeted and random urinalysis tests results conducted on Narcotics Bureau personnel from January 1, 1996 to December 31, 2001;

 

14.  Municipal Court databases for all 1999 and 2000 disposed municipal level narcotics cases and review of approximately five hundred Municipal Court case files in which the narcotics arrests were dismissed/discharged;

 

15.  Review of Common Pleas Court case records to determine the disposition of nearly 1,800 narcotics arrests;

 

16.  Review of approximately three hundred and fifty arrest/discovery files maintained by the Narcotics Strike Force and Narcotic Field Units;

 

17.  Departmental policies and practices related to the use and management of confidential informants and an audit of approximately one hundred confidential informant files maintained by the Narcotics Field Units;

 

18.  Direct observation of the execution of numerous search and seizure warrants, undercover surveillances, arrests, and vehicle and pedestrian investigations conducted by Narcotics Bureau officers and supervisors.

 

19.  More than two dozen interviews with Philadelphia Police Department Narcotics Bureau personnel, narcotics officers and agents from other state and Federal drug enforcement agencies, and experts in the area of narcotics enforcement not affiliated with the Philadelphia Police Department.

 

20.  An extensive interview with a former Philadelphia police officer who was dismissed from the force and jailed for criminal activities related to narcotics enforcement.

 

 

Assessing the extent to which narcotics enforcement operations are conducted legally, ethically, and within the Philadelphia Police Department  guidelines is hindered by the obvious fact that only in the most unusual of circumstances do officers intentionally reveal or document their misdeeds.  To overcome this hurdle, the IAO undertook a three-prong approach to this study:

 

1.      First, to find evidence of existing or emerging patterns indicative of improper or illegal narcotics enforcement practices we reviewed available information sources, records, and databases documenting Narcotics Bureau activities, investigations by the IAB into specific allegations of misconduct arising from narcotics enforcement activities, and other internal studies and audits initiated by the Department to assess the integrity of the Narcotics Bureau.

 

2.      Second, the IAO examined written Department policies related to narcotics enforcement operations to determine whether they reflected best practices. The IAO then conducted extensive study and observation of Narcotics Bureau operations to determine the extent to which these policies are actually practiced.  Formal written policies, no matter how ideal they may appear on their face, are meaningless if they are ignored or circumvented. 

 

3.  Third, the IAO conducted dozens of interviews and spent considerable time

in the field with officers, supervisors, and commanders responsible for narcotics enforcement efforts to better understand the realities and complexities of their jobs.  Due to the unique issues surrounding narcotics enforcement, we found it necessary to expand the scope of our interviews to include other local agencies in the criminal justice system as well as other State and Federal law enforcement agencies responsible for enforcing narcotics laws. 

 

 

Aftermath of the 39th District Scandal

 

In the aftermath of the 39th District scandal, Departmental efforts to combat drug trafficking in Philadelphia were significantly curtailed.  Police districts were banned from narcotics enforcement activities and exclusive jurisdiction for narcotics enforcement was centralized in what was then called the Special Investigations Bureau (SIB).  The SIB was understaffed and ill equipped to dismantle the hundreds of open air drug markets that were operating around the clock. Years of lax enforcement enabled drug trafficking organizations to develop strongholds in Philadelphia neighborhoods and established Philadelphia as a narcotics “source” city with some of the purest and cheapest narcotics in the nation.  Philadelphia experienced an alarming increase in drug related homicides and other crimes at a time when other major cities in the nation were reporting decreases in their crime rates.

 

In 1997, significant community and political pressure was brought to bear on the Department for its lack of focus on the drug problem and its devastating impact on individuals and communities throughout the city.  In response, the Department dramatically increased its narcotics enforcement efforts.   In 1997, SIB was renamed the Narcotics Bureau and over the next five years experienced a 140% increase in sworn personnel.  Narcotics arrests increased Department-wide by nearly 200%. (See Table 1)

 

     

 

 

Table 1

 

       Year                # Officers assigned to                # Narcotics Arrests by                Total Narcotics Arrests

                                Narcotics Bureau      Narcotics Bureau       Department-Wide

         1996                          250                             not available                         not available

         1997                          251                             not available                              8,682

         1998                          415                                 6,224                                    19,210

         1999                          451                                 7,901                                    22,613

         2000                          577                                 9,837                                    23,852

         2001                          601*                              11,229                                   24,845

*Approximately seventy officers assigned to the Narcotics Bureau are detailed out to various interagency drug task forces which include, among others, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office. While these officers are still under the jurisdiction of the Philadelphia Police Department, they are not under the direct supervision of the Department on a daily basis.  The Narcotics Bureau also has a City Wide Vice Unit that is responsible for enforcing laws related to gambling, prostitution, and liquor sales.  An average of thirty sworn personnel who are currently assigned to the Narcotics Bureau are detailed to the Vice Unit.  For purposes of this study we focused solely on the narcotics enforcement operations of the Bureau. 

 

 

Some of this upsurge in activity was attributable to “Operation Sunrise” - a coordinated effort by several city agencies beginning in 1998 to address drug trafficking and other quality of life issues in some of the city’s most drug besieged communities.  In May 2002, the Department rolled out “Operation Safe Streets”- another major narcotics enforcement initiative in which hundreds of uniformed officers were redeployed to the city’s drug dealing hot spots in an attempt to disrupt narcotics trafficking.  Arrests and seizures have significantly increased since the inception of Operation Safe Streets.

 

 

Narcotics Bureau Mission and Organizational Structure

 

The Mission Statement of the Narcotics Bureau stipulates that its objective is:

 

 “To aggressively enforce City and State laws related to narcotics through overt and covert investigations designed to identify, disrupt and eliminate the activities of criminal organizations specifically engaged in drug trafficking.  The Narcotics Bureau employs uniformed and non-uniformed officers as well as local, state and federal task force personnel in both short and long term investigations.  The objective is to secure intelligence information, gather evidence, effect arrests, and assist in the successful prosecution of offenders.  It is the goal of the Bureau to aggressively attack the purveyors of these illegal activities on a daily basis through a comprehensive approach in an effort to stabilize and secure our neighborhoods and enhance the quality of life for members of the community”

 

 

The Narcotics Bureau has undergone several reorganizations since 1997.  Currently, the Narcotics Bureau is comprised of the following units located at facilities throughout the city:

Narcotics Strike Force (“NSF”) – The purpose of the NSF is to eradicate open street sales of narcotics using both uniform patrol with covert surveillance operations, and to assist other Narcotics Bureau units and agencies with a uniformed presence in narcotics investigations. 

 

Narcotics Field Units (“NFU”) –There are currently three NFU’s that concentrate on specified geographic areas in the City.  The NFU’s are comprised of plainclothes/undercover personnel who focus on indoor sales locations.  NFU’s are authorized to conduct longer term investigations than the district Narcotics Enforcement Teams and the Narcotics Strike Force, and to utilize a variety of investigative techniques such as acting as narcotics buyers (so-called “buy-busts” and sellers (so-called “reverse stings”), surveillances, confidential informants, and search and seizure warrants.  In 2000, each NFU established a Violence Response Team (VRT) comprised of approximately seven to nine undercover officers who are deployed to locations experiencing a surge of violent incidents believed to be drug related.

 

Narcotics Intelligence and Investigation Unit (NIIU) - The NIIU gathers, analyzes, and disseminates intelligence regarding drug-related criminal organizations, conducts investigations leading to the forfeiture of criminal proceeds,

provides specialized technical support to other Narcotics Bureau units, and coordinates Philadelphia police resources in federal, state and local task force initiatives combating drug trafficking.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

   

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

TRENDS AND PATTERNS IN

                                                EXISTING DATA

 

Information Sources

 

            The IAO reviewed and analyzed the following six major sources of data to assess the existence or extent of improper or illegal narcotics enforcement practices:

 

1.      Records of lawsuits and Settlement Recommendations prepared by the Law Department of the City of Philadelphia (“Litigation”).

 

2.      IAB investigations of the activities of the Narcotics Bureau.

 

3.      The Philadelphia Police Department’s records regarding “Use of Force” and “Shootings”.    

 

4.      Court attendance records of narcotics officers maintained by the Police Department.

 

5.      Philadelphia Municipal and Common Pleas Court records regarding the disposition of narcotics arrests.

 

6.      Departmental studies and audits of Narcotics Bureau operations.

 

 

           

Litigation

 

The IAO examined lawsuits filed against the Police Department by individuals who claimed that their rights were in some way violated as a result of narcotics enforcement activities.   These litigation records offer valuable insight and evidence into the extent to which narcotics officers are operating within the bounds of the law and Departmental policy.  The IAO analyzed all cases that were settled between January 1, 1993 and December 31, 2001, in which the City incurred financial liability as a result of Department wide narcotics enforcement activities, and not just those lawsuits which were the result of Narcotics Bureau activities.  This review and analysis also did not include active/open lawsuits, or suits that were closed without payment or dismissed for a variety of reasons.

 

The IAO’s attempts to identify all lawsuits resulting from narcotics enforcement activities proved to be problematic.  First, the Department does not maintain consistent, detailed, and centralized records regarding civil rights litigation involving police personnel.  Therefore it was necessary to rely upon a computerized case management system maintained by the Civil Rights Unit of the City’s Law Department. 

 

Second, the IAO conducted a more detailed review of all Settlement Recommendations prepared by the Law Department, which set forth the facts of the case and the reasons for settlement.  In both the databases and Recommendations of Settlement, information provided was frequently vague.  These records did not always contain the involved officer’s name, payroll number, and district/unit of assignment at the time of the alleged misconduct.  As demonstrated in Table 2, factual descriptions of the alleged misconduct were also extremely vague. This made it extremely difficult to determine whether some lawsuits were the result of narcotics enforcement activities. (The IAO identified over thirty narcotics related lawsuits that were not provided to us by the Law Department in our request for this information.)

 

For these reasons, the statistics included in Tables 3 through 6* cannot be considered to be comprehensive.  However the IAO is confident that they do represent the vast majority of lawsuits initiated as a result of narcotics activities over the time period studied.

 

 

 

 

Table 2

 

EXAMPLES OF VAGUE CASE DESCRIPTIONS IN CIVIL RIGHTS DATABASE

·       “Plaintiff claims police subjected him to excessive force”.

·       “Plaintiff claims police threw him to the ground them kicked him in the face as

              they entered his residence to serve a search and seizure warrant.”

·        “Plaintiff claims police falsely arrested and improperly searched her and seized

               her money.”

·       “Plaintiff claims he was subjected to excessive force and illegal search and seizure.

·       “Plaintiff claims he was sitting on the steps of his home when, without cause or

               justification, he was stopped and seized by police officers.”

·       “Plaintiff claims police forced their way into his home, handcuffed him and falsely

               arrested him.”

·       “Plaintiff was arrested during an incident”

·       “Plaintiff was stopped in his car by plainclothes police in an unmarked car and

              beaten.” 

·       “Plaintiff’s house was searched by Police.” 

·       “Plaintiff states the police caused him to be the recipient of civil rights violations

              and property damage because of false arrest.”

·       “Plaintiff states he received injuries during an incident with police”

 

 

 

 

____________________________

 

*These Tables were originally compiled by Law Department personnel and subsequently modified by the IAO.

 

Table 3

 

Year                  # of Narcotics                        Total Amount of Settlements

                          Cases Settled            

1993                              3                                            $571,000.00

1994                              2                                            $147,000.00

1995                              8                                            $323,500.00

1996*                          39                                          $4,143,048.00

1997                            17                                            $812,000.00

1998                            10                                            $682,000.00

1999                            15                                            $363,500.00

2000                              7                                            $313,500.00

2001                            14                                            $350,000.00

_______________________________________________________

9 years                        115 cases                           $7,706,048**

 

*Many of the 39th District lawsuits were settled this year.

**$4,025,440 (52%) of the total settlement costs resulted from 39th District cases. 

 

 

 

Table 4

 

Nature of complaint*                                                           # of Times Alleged                                                                      

Excessive Force/Assault/Battery                                                                                                       53

False arrest                                                                                                                                          49

Illegal search and seizure/illegal entry                                                                                      19

False imprisonment                                                                                                                       16

Failure to train, discipline, and supervise                                                                                               14

Malicious prosecution                                                                                                                           12

Fabrication of evidence (incl. Planting drugs)/false police reports                                       7

Theft                                                                                                                                                      5

Damage to Property                                                                                                                                3

Fabrication of probable cause to support affidavit for search warrant                  4

Improper strip search                                                                                                                    3

Intentional infliction of emotional distress                                                                                 2

Lack of probable cause to support affidavit for search warrant                                    2

Failure to provide necessary medical care                                                                                         1

Perjury                                                                                                                                                  1

Freedom of speech violation                                                                                                   1

Violation of PA. Unfair Trade Practices Consumer Protection Law                                     1

Loss of consortium                                                                                                                           1

 

* Many cases set forth more than one complaint.

 

 

 

 

Table 5

  

            Total number of officers involved and the number of suits in

                     which each officer was a named defendant.

 

2 officers were defendants in 18 cases each (39th District officers)

1 officer was a defendant in 10 cases (39th District officer)

2 officers were defendants in 6 cases each (39th District officers)

3 officers were defendants in 4 cases each

3 officers were defendants in 3 cases each

8 officers were defendants in 2 cases each

           126 officers were defendants in 1 case each

_________________

Total 145 officers

 

 

 

Table 6

 

Reasons for Settlement*                                                                            No.

 

Too costly to proceed to trial                                                                                                     34

Officer(s) had prior IAD complaints and/or convictions                                                           27

Strong evidence of physical/mental injury of plaintiff/s                                                               19

Plausible plaintiff(s)/ strong witnesses                                                                                  17

Evidence of officer(s) misconduct                                                                                                           9

Inconsistent statements/versions of officer(s)                                                                                      8

Difficulty obtaining evidence/witnesses to support City’s defense                                      7

Concern that publicity surrounding 39th District would affect outcome                                      6

Concern of malicious prosecution claim                                                                                 6

Plaintiff(s) had no or insignificant prior criminal history                                                   6

Lack of police paperwork for case                                                                                                        5

Concern that jury would award large amount because of length of incarceration                    4

Weak affidavit of probable cause                                                                                                     4

Police reports do not corroborate with officer(s) account(s)                                                             3

Excessive property damage                                                                                                  2

Officer(s) admission of lack of probable cause to arrest                                                 2

Significant number of convictions involving an officer were discarded                                               2

Concern that jury would find officer(s) did not insure appropriate medical care                          1

Lack of reasonable suspicion to frisk                                                                                 1

Officer(s) repeated failure to appear to testify                                                                   1

Repeated arrests by same officer – evidence of harassment                                                            1

Officer’s failure to obtain search warrant weakened City’s defense                                      1

Plaintiff not criminally charged                                                                                                  1

Finding of exculpatory evidence in favor of Plaintiff                                                                              1

Concern of appearance/accusation of racial bias                                                                         1

 

* Many cases set forth more than one reason for settlement

 

Interpretation and Analysis of Litigation Data

 

            Litigation data must be interpreted with caution.  Whether a lawsuit is settled does not necessarily mean that the police action was improper.  Various factors impact on the decision to settle a case, including the cost of trial and trial preparation.  In our society, litigation costs are unavoidable.  It would be impossible as a practical matter to completely eliminate settlement or verdict costs; the point is to analyze information to try to minimize those costs.

           

With the exception of the 39th District cases, the IAO review of the litigation records did not indicate any patterns or trends of police misconduct in narcotics enforcement activities either by unit or officer.   In a few cases, important policy and integrity issues were implicated and serious injuries/damages were sustained which justified significant settlements.  In a large percentage of the cases however, the circumstances surrounding the allegations, and the subsequent settlement amounts, indicated that many of the claims were relatively minor.

   

            This study underscores the need for improved coordination between the Law Department and the Police Department related to lawsuits filed against police personnel.  Additionally, the Department would benefit from the creation of its own litigation database involving police personnel that should include necessary data fields such as the officer(s) name and payroll number(s), the date of incident, the unit/district/squad to which the involved officer(s) were assigned at the time of the alleged incidents, the allegations, and in physical abuse claims - the type of force used and a description of the injuries sustained.  This information would enable the Police Department to identify emerging patterns or problems related to a particular officer, squad, or unit which could trigger proactive responses and prevent potential litigation - at great savings to the taxpayers of this City.* 

 

Additionally, such information would be readily accessible when an officer is being considered for assignment to specialized and sensitive units, such as the Narcotics Bureau.  We identified two lawsuits against officers for actions taken prior to their assignment to the Narcotics Bureau which would have been relevant in assessing these officers’ suitability for the Narcotics Bureau.**

 

________________________

* For example, one lawsuit involved several narcotics officers who used force against a civilian who was injured but not arrested.  The injured person’s name does not appear anywhere in the police reports, IAB was never notified of the force incident as required by Departmental policy, and no IAB investigation into the incident occurred. The injured civilian filed a civil rights lawsuit and the case settled for $12,500.  In this case numerous Departmental policies were violated, yet none of the involved officers or supervisors were held accountable.  

 

**Because judicial economy and avoidance of costs may be factors in the decision to settle a lawsuit, settlement does not in and of itself mean that the officer committed any wrongdoing.  In light of the fact that a record of lawsuits may appear in an officer’s employment history, an explanation of the reason for the settlement should be made part of the officer’s record so that the officer is not unfairly stigmatized or penalized. 

IAB Investigations

 

            In addition to the IAO’s ongoing review of all IAB investigations, for this study a detailed examination was conducted of all IAB investigations, arising from Narcotics Bureau activities that were completed between January 1, 1999 and July 1, 2002.  Since newly completed investigations are regularly reviewed by the IAO, these statistics were updated throughout the duration of this study.  At the time of this writing IAB had approximately fourteen active/open Complaints Against Police (“CAP’s”) and eleven active/open “internal”* investigations arising from Narcotics Bureau activities.

 

          A statistical breakdown of these investigations is presented in Tables 7 and 8.

 

 

 

                                                 

   Table 7

 

       IAB Investigations of the Narcotics Bureau Completed in 1999-2001  

     

                                       CAP’s       INTERNAL’s

                            

                         1999           27                   19                         

                         2000           30                   20                                

                         2001            9                    13             

 

                        Total         66                    52

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

_________________________

 

*“CAP” investigations are initiated when a citizen files a complaint alleging some type of police misconduct.  These investigations may be reviewed by the public.   “Internal” investigations are initiated by the IAB and they are not available for public review.

 

      

 

Table 8

Allegations and Conclusions/Completed IAB Investigations 1999- July 2001

 

Allegations*

 

Total

 

Exonerated

 

Unfounded

    Not

Sustained

 

Sustained

Closed

Without finding

 

      Other Conclusion

Excessive Force

30

13

3

10

0

2

2-within guidelines

 

Verbal Abuse

 

17

2

2

11

1

1

0

Off Duty (see below)

16

0

1

3

7

0

2- w/drawn by CW.

1-w/drawn by IAD.

2 -Dept. violations.

Other (see below)

31

1

3

7

14

1

1-closed w/out merit

1-no wrongdoing found

2-referred to FBI

1-Field test reliable

Illegal/improper

Detention/search/seizure

 

17

11

0

4

2

0

0

False Arrest

17

8

1

1

2

3

2-w/drawn by IAD

Theft

10

3

2

3

2

 

0

Improper Search and    Seizure Warrant

3

1

1

0

1

0

0

Property Damage

5

2

0

2

0

1

0

Associating with drug

dealers/criminals

8

0

4

3

0

0

1- refer to FBI

Releasing Confidential

Information

4

2

0

2

0

0

0

Lack  of Service                   

3

2

1

0

0

0

0

Total Allegations

161

45

18

46

29

8

15

*Numerous investigations contain more than one allegation of misconduct

 

                                    

 

 Internal Affairs Conclusion Definitions

SUSTAINED – The investigation proved that the complainant’s allegations occurred and that officer’s actions were inconsistent with Departmental policy, directives, disciplinary code, or applicable local, state, or federal law.

NOT SUSTAINED - IAB investigation can neither prove nor disprove the allegation.

UNFOUNDED - The alleged incident did not occur.

EXONERATED - The acts alleged did in fact occur, but the officer’s actions were proper, lawful, and in accordance with Departmental policy.

WITHDRAWN - The complainant voluntarily withdraws complaint.

DEPARTMENTAL VIOLATIONS - The investigation uncovered infractions of Departmental rules, directives, or procedures.

REFERRED TO - Internal Affairs completed their investigation and referred the information to another unit or agency (city, state, or federal) for further investigation.

INACTIVE STATUS - The complainant will not consent to an IAB interview due to a pending court proceeding.  The investigation will be reopened when the court proceedings are concluded.

CLOSED WITHOUT FINDINGS - The complainant does not cooperate with the investigation and the investigator made reasonable efforts to obtain cooperation.

 

 

 

 

 

                A more detailed breakdown of the “off-duty” allegations/incidents is provided below:

 

5 - Domestic violence - 2 not sustained, 1 frivolous, 2 sustained 

2 - Unprofessional conduct by officer after auto accidents – Departmental

violations on both

1 - Unauthorized outside employment - sustained

1 - Hit and run – sustained

1 - Officer family member selling drugs from officer’s home – unfounded

1 - Theft – withdrawn by complainant

1 - Insurance fraud - sustained

1 - Threats – not sustained

1 - Harassment – withdrawn by complainant

1 - Allegation that officer is a drug dealer – Withdrawn by the IAB.  Complainant

clearly unstable.

1 - Violation of Department use of force policy – sustained

1 – Allegations of verbal abuse, threats, associating with known criminals, and failing to cooperate and lying during Departmental investigation against one officer - all allegations sustained. 

 

 

                Allegations classified as “other” in Table 8 include the following:

 

 

5 - Harassment – 2 not sustained, 1 closed without merit, 2 unfounded

2 - Improper issuance of traffic tickets – 1 exonerated, 1 sustained

2 - Excessive payments to confidential informants – 1 not sustained, 1 sustained

2 Failure to cooperate with and lying during Departmental investigation - 2 sustained    

2 - Criminal activity- referred to FBI (due to extreme sensitivity of these investigations, the allegations cannot be disclosed) 

2 - Threats – 1 unfounded, 1 sustained

2 - Abuse of authority – 1 sustained, 1 not sustained

1 - False entry on Daily Attendance Report – sustained

1 - Failure to patrol – sustained

1 - Sudden death of civilian during search of home– no wrongdoing by officers involved

1 - False overtime requests – not sustained

1 - Impersonating an IAB officer - sustained

1 - Leaving scene of accident – not sustained

1 - Narcotics use by officer – not sustained    

1 - Loss of seized narcotic evidence - sustained

1 - Watching pornography during execution of a search warrant - sustained

1 - Failure to prepare property receipt - sustained

1 - Failure of supervisor to review strip search reports – sustained

1 - Investigation into reliability of field test

1 – Allegation that narcotics officer is selling stolen firearms – Complainant fails to cooperate.  Investigation is “Closed without findings”.

 

 

Analysis of IAB Data

 

            Overall, the IAB investigations appear to be thorough and unbiased.  With few exceptions, IAB investigators conducted complete investigations regardless of the source of the complaint (i.e. complainant was anonymous, incarcerated, a convicted felon, a chronic complaint filer, etc.), obtained the necessary evidence and records, conducted interviews with relevant witnesses, and reached conclusions that were reasonable and consistent with the evidence.

 

No persistent patterns of misconduct by any particular unit, squad, or officer were identified.  However, some investigations revealed serious integrity issues related to particular officers, and violations of specific Departmental policies, particularly as it relates to confidential informants, evidence control, supervisory oversight, and execution of search warrants, that will be addressed in greater detail later in the Report.

 

            The IAO remains satisfied that, overall, the IAB continues to effectively fulfill its critical role as the Department’s internal investigator of specified allegations of misconduct and corruption. However, the following weaknesses should be noted:

 

·       Some of the IAB investigations indicated that violations of Departmental policies regarding the proper execution of search and seizure warrants, questionable or poorly articulated legal basis for detentions and arrests, or possible improprieties in the scope of some searches may have occurred, yet these issues were not always examined or addressed in the investigations. 

 

These oversights indicate a need for the IAB investigators to receive additional training in legal and Departmental standards related to searches and seizures, and/or stronger emphasis on the IAB investigators’ responsibility to fully explore these issues.

 

·       Extensive delays exist in completing IAB investigations. Executive Order 9-93, (a 1993 Mayoral decree that establishes Departmental guidelines for investigations into citizen complaints against police) requires that IAB complete CAP investigations within seventy-five days after receipt of the complaint.  We reviewed only five out of approximately sixty-five Narcotics Bureau CAP investigations that were completed within the mandated time period.  Some investigations took over a year, and others, several years, to complete.  Most troubling were those investigations in which serious corruption allegations against active narcotics officers and supervisors remain unresolved for months.

 

IAB backlogs have been and continue to be a serious problem.  The IAO has addressed this issue in prior reports and noted that numerous factors contribute to delays, some of which are beyond the control of the IAB.  (See: IAO First Monitoring Report, November 1997). Regardless of the causes, these delays have widespread negative implications and are stressful for the officers against whom investigations are pending.  The backlog decreases public confidence in the Department as months elapse without any resolution of complaints.  Finally, extensive delays threaten to adversely impact the integrity of the investigation process as evidence and witnesses can be lost to time or indifference.

 

It is imperative that the IAB investigation requirements, established nearly a decade ago, be re-evaluated and that the Department, in conjunction with other relevant agencies, such as the District Attorney’s Office*, devise solutions to get a handle on the critical backlog problem.

 

·       The following inconsistencies, ambiguities, and errors were identified in both investigative conclusions and the IAB database:

 

1.       As indicated in Table 8, the majority of “sustained” allegations are classified into the ambiguous and catchall category of “other”. These investigations tend to implicate more serious integrity allegations. Yet, because the IAB’s categorical breakdown of allegations is limited, the database is not particularly useful in assessing the types of misconduct that the IAB has investigated without review of the investigative files.

 

2.      Citizens initiating complaints against police may subsequently refuse to cooperate in the ensuing IAB investigations.   In some of these cases, the IAB terminated the investigation as “closed without findings” due to lack of cooperation by the complainant.  In other investigations involving non-cooperative complainants, the IAB either concluded that the allegations were “not-sustained” “exonerated” or “unfounded”.    The IAO could not identify standards or guidelines for determining the IAB’s course of action in these circumstances.

 

3.      In several “internally” generated use of force investigations*, the IAB reached conclusions about whether the officer used

_________________      

*IAB cannot interview the target officer until the District Attorney’ Office has formally informed the Department that it does not intend to pursue criminal charges against the target officer.  Many active IAB investigations languish for months waiting for the District Attorney’s determination in these cases.

 

**Use of force investigations are initiated in at least two ways.  In the first instance, a civilian files a complaint against police (CAP) alleging physical abuse. The IAB is mandated to fully investigate every CAP, regardless of the allegation.  In other cases, Departmental policy requires that the IAB be notified of specified force incidents.  After review of a force notification, the IAB may unilaterally decide to initiate an “internal” force investigation into the incident to determine whether the use of force was reasonable and justified. In 2001 for example, the IAB initiated approximately 37 internal use of force investigations.  Injured suspects rarely cooperate with “internal” force investigations.

excessive force despite the fact that no excessive force allegation was made.  In these cases, the IAB investigation should determine whether or not the use of force was reasonable, justified, and within Departmental guidelines.  For example, after being notified per Departmental policy that a suspect sustained a head injury during a narcotics arrest, the IAB initiated an investigation to assess whether the force used was warranted, reasonable and within Departmental guidelines. The IAB investigation concluded,  “The allegation that the [officers] used excessive force is ‘Unfounded’. The defendant’s attempts to resist arrest, by fleeing and then assaulting the officer, caused himself and the officer to receive injuries”.  Since there was no allegation of excessive force, this conclusion is inappropriate and unfairly stigmatizes the officer.

 

4.      The IAB investigated a narcotics officer for associating with, and tipping off, a known drug dealer about the dealer’s impending arrest for aggravated assault. During his interview with the IAB, the drug dealer admitted to being informed by the narcotics officer that the he was wanted for the assault. The IAB investigative conclusion was “closed without findings”, and the IAB database entry indicated that the officer was “Exonerated” of these allegations.  

 

5.      In a CAP alleging illegal arrest and search, the investigation was both “closed without finding” due to lack of cooperation by complainant and the targeted officers “exonerated” of the allegations.  The IAB database entry for this same investigation indicates that the allegation of an illegal search was “sustained”.  In another CAP alleging excessive force the investigation was both “Closed without Findings Due to Lack of Cooperation by Complainant” and “Not Sustained”. 

 

Use of Force 

 

To assess the extent to which force has been used by Narcotics Bureau officers, the IAO examined the Department’s “use of force” and “shooting” databases, which are summarized in Tables 9 and 10,  and the “use of force” investigations, including shootings, completed by the IAB from 1998-2001.   In a 1999 report issued by the IAO, numerous deficiencies in the Department’s use of force reporting, tracking, and investigative policies and practices were documented.  Since that time, the Department has undertaken numerous reforms to improve the problems identified. However, the following examples are evidence that under-reporting, inaccuracies, and ambiguities in use of force reporting and monitoring persist:

 

·        The IAO identified several IAB investigations in which force was used against a suspect who required medical treatment, yet these force incidents did not appear on the officer’s use of force history.

 

·        Two audits conducted by the IAB found that in a two month period in 2000 and 2001, eighty-one force incidents had not been reported to the IAB per Departmental policy.  The IAO was unable to ascertain from these audits precisely which units in the Department failed to report the force incidents.  These audits confirm that the force database is incomplete.

 

·        In some force incidents, several officers may be present, but only one officer actually used the force.  In these situations, the database indicates that each officer present used the force indicated. In one case for example, three narcotics officers were on the scene when OC (pepper) Spray was used on a suspect, yet only one narcotics officer actually used the spray.  The database entry for this incident indicates that all three officers used OC Spray.  Conversely, there were several cases in which more than one narcotics officer was directly involved in a force incident, yet the database entries identified only one of the involved officers as using force.

 

·        The types of force used most frequently by Philadelphia police officers, including narcotics officers, include pushing, shoving, tackling, punching, kicking, grabbing etc.  However,  these different forms of force are subsumed under the catchall category of “other”.  Thus the existing force database does not reflect the reality and particularities of the force used by narcotics officers.

 

·        The IAO identified data base entries where descriptions of the force used were too vague (i.e. “passive restraint”  “control holds” “subdue” “physically subdued”). In some cases the IAO could not ascertain the severity of the injuries because of uninformative descriptions (i.e. “injuries to arm and face”  “injury to mouth”  “injured face” “injury rib-stomach” “laceration to head”). 

 

·        In each of the following examples the database indicated that “no force” was used, yet the suspect sustained injuries that appear to be force related: 

-“Suspect injured when he “scraped head on brick wall while being

  frisked.”

 

-“Defendant transported to hospital for rib injury sustained while

 being helped to feet.”

 

 

-“Defendant “struggled” with police and sustained stitches over left

 eye.”

 

-Defendant “tried to escape and sustained lacerations to face and

 head.”

 

-Defendant exited vehicle with box cutter and was “put to the

  ground” sustaining injuries to lip and eye.

 

-Defendant “acted aggressively and OC Spray was used”. 

 

-Defendant fled police, cut right arm and “received injury when

 officer put handcuffs on defendant.” 

 

-Defendant “attempted to strike officer and received a cut to the

  head.”

 

-Defendant was tackled while fleeing and suffered sprained ankle.

 

-Defendant “received injury during arrest” 

 

Therefore it is not possible to conclude that the use of force statistics presented in Table 10 are either comprehensive or accurate.  However, there is a system of checks and balances within the Department which, along with citizen accessibility to the civilian complaint process and the legal system, offer assurances that serious force incidents do not escape detection with any regularity.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

                                                         

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

           Table 9

Firearms Discharges-Narcotics Bureau

 

Year

# shootings

# officers

involved

NIIU

NSF

NFU

North

NFU

East

NFU

South

Special

Invest.

Violations

Found

No     

Violations

Miscellaneous

1999

14

20

2

3

2

3

2

2

3

15

2 -unfounded

2000

10

13

2

1

4

1

1

1

4

9

0

2001

11

15

1

4

5

0

0

0

0

5

7-open investigations

Total

35

48

5

8

11

4

3

3

7

29

9

 

           

 

                                                       Table 10

Reported Use of Force Incidents - Narcotics Bureau 1998-2001*

 

Unit/Year

Total use of force

     Incidents

Reported to IAD

“Other” (includes tackles, punches, kicks, struggles, etc.)

OC Spray

Baton

Not

Indicated

Taser

Blackjack

NSF

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1998

9

3

1

1

2

0

2

1999

24

1

9

2

12

0

0

2000

28

15

9

2

2

0

0

2001

60

46

10

3

0

1

0

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

NFU North

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1998

2

0

0

0

1

0

1

1999

4

0

0

2

2

0

0

2000

13

6

5

0

2

0

0

2001

16

13

1

0

0

2

0

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

NFU East

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1998

2

2

0

0

0

0

0

1999

2

0

2

0

0

0

0

2000

4

1

2

0

0

1

0

2001

22

19

3

0

0

0

0

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

NFU South

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1998

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1999

1

0

0

0

0

1

0

2000

6

0

5

0

0

1

0

2001

14

11

2

0

0

1

0

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

DEA Task Force

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1998

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1999

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

2000

1

0

1

0

0

0

0

2001

3

1

2

0

0

0

0

*In some force incidents, more than one type of force was used.                                            

 

 

 

Court Attendance

 

As the 39th District scandal unfolded it became evident that the officers who were implicated repeatedly failed to appear in court to testify in drug cases in which they had participated in the arrests or secured search warrants. This behavior was identified as a key indicator of misconduct and corruption. It can be inferred that these officers disregarded their court notices to avoid being effectively cross-examined in cases where they knew they had broken the law, or violated civil rights or Departmental policies. A pattern of failures to appear in court may also indicate that an officer is cooperating with drug dealers.

 

To assess whether any similar patterns or practices related to court appearances were occurring in the Narcotics Bureau, the IAO obtained information maintained by the Department in a “Court Attendance” database.  Philadelphia police officers are provided identification cards with a bar code identifier unique to each officer.  Whenever officers receive court notices to appear in court they are required to “swipe” the card at the court attendance office to document their arrival and departure times.  This enables the Department to monitor officers’ court attendance and overtime costs. Supervisors are responsible for monitoring officer compliance with court notices and ensuring that legitimate reasons for not appearing (such as being on an “on-call” status, on vacation, sick, on funeral leave, or injured on duty), are properly coded and entered into the database.  <