PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT
INTEGRITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
ENFORCEMENT OF NARCOTICS LAWS
July 2002
Ellen Green-Ceisler
Director, Integrity & Accountability Office
Author
TABLE
OF CONTENTS
OVERVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . 1
BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The
Integrity and Accountability Office . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Basis
for Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Aftermath of the 39th District Scandal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Narcotics Bureau Mission and Organizational Structure . . . 8
TRENDS AND PATTERNS IN EXISTING DATA . . . . . . . . . 10
Information Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Litigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Interpretation and Analysis of Litigation Data . . . . 14
IAB Investigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Analysis of IAB Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ………. 17
Use of Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Court Attendance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Narcotics Arrests Dispositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Departmental Studies and Audits of Narcotics Operations . 30
Integrity Control Office – Narcotics Bureau . . . . . . 31
Integrity Control Unit – Internal Affairs Bureau. . . 32
Quality Assurance Bureau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Drug Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Summary Analysis of Information Sources . . . . . . . . . … 35
NARCOTICS BUREAU PERSONNEL AND MANAGEMENT
POLICIES,
PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Personnel Selection Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . …… 36
Narcotics Enforcement Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . … 39
Transfer Policies, Practices and Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . …… 40
Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . …. 42
Supervisory Oversight and Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Discipline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Evidence Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
CI’s and Controlled Narcotics Buys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
THE ENFORCEMENT OF NARCOTICS LAWS AND
CIVIL RIGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
OVERVIEW
This study by the Integrity
and Accountability Office examines the policies and practices of the narcotics
enforcement operations of the Philadelphia Police Department to insure that
these efforts are conducted legally, ethically, and within Departmental
guidelines. In light of the vastly increased
drug enforcement operations undertaken by the Department over the past five
years, a comprehensive examination and assessment of the integrity and
effectiveness of these efforts is timely and necessary.
The IAO’s review and analysis of a variety of objective information sources indicates that the Department’s narcotics enforcement operations are largely conducted within the boundaries established by law and Departmental policies – as it relates to serious corruption and excessive force. However, the IAO identified important policy, operational, and management weaknesses that have created conditions conducive to breeding corruption and decreasing the detection of misconduct or corruption.
Based on the findings of this study, the Department is in the process of implementing certain policies and practices to remedy some of the problems most directly under its control. These remedial measures, which are in their initial stages, have been incorporated into this Report. It is not reasonable to speculate as to the future impact of these changes and subsequent follow-up will be necessary to evaluate their effectiveness. Other problems identified in this Report have labor and/or budgetary implications, or require the cooperation and coordination of other governmental agencies, and are therefore not conducive to easy or quick resolution.
The following is a brief synopsis of the IAO’s findings. The factual bases for these general statements are detailed in the body of the report:
1.
The Philadelphia
Police Department does not collect some critical
information that would enable
it to monitor the integrity and effectiveness of its narcotics enforcement
operations. Some relevant
information/data that is collected is not consistently and effectively
utilized by the Department.
2.
The Department’s
internal auditing functions of narcotics enforcement
operations are sporadic and
at times ineffective. In some
instances, the Department did not take appropriate steps to rectify problems
identified in audits that had been conducted.
The Department lacks established and enforceable policies and protocols
regarding management obligations and responses to internal audits and
investigations, particularly those in which problems are noted.
3. The Narcotics Bureau personnel
selection process is inadequate and ineffective, increasing the likelihood that
officers ill suited for these duties are assigned to narcotics enforcement
operations. Considering the numerous
opportunities for corruption that exist in narcotics enforcement, it is
imperative that officers and supervisors assigned to the Narcotics Bureau
undergo a rigorous screening process to ensure a proven track record of
integrity.
4.
Officer training in critical aspects of
narcotics law enforcement is
inconsistent and sporadic.
5.
Narcotics Bureau
supervisors are not consistently experienced, screened,
trained, evaluated,
monitored, held accountable, disciplined, or afforded appropriate resources
with which to effectively fulfill their duties. These problems raise questions regarding the effectiveness of supervisory
oversight in narcotics enforcement operations which is a critical component in
ensuring the integrity of such corruption prone operations.
6.
Systematic transfers
and rotations of narcotics officers and supervisors
do not occur which raises
potentially serious integrity problems.
It is critical that term limits be initiated and enforced on a regular
basis.
7.
Disciplinary
practices in the Narcotics Bureau are lax and inconsistent.
8.
The Narcotics Bureau
does not strictly enforce or monitor compliance
with applicable Department
regulations regarding the handling of evidence seized in narcotics
investigations.
9. Prior to the recent
implementation of remedial procedures, supervision and monitoring of
confidential informants has been marginal.
It is too early to determine the effectiveness of these changes.
10. There
are a variety of conditions that may encourage narcotics officers to
“cut constitutional corners” in the enforcement of narcotics laws. Such factors include the following:
·
Narcotics officers
receive compensation and other considerations based on their activity/arrest
statistics.
·
Inefficiencies and
inequities in the Department and criminal justice system as a whole adversely
impact officer morale and their commitment to organizational and legal
standards.
·
Extreme and unrealistic
pressures are placed on officers to “solve” the drug problem.
·
Officers receive
inadequate training as to the applicable legal standards.
·
Enforcement of the Department’s policies created to ensure
that citizens’ civil rights are protected is not consistent.
In the late 1980’s a squad of 39th District police officers responsible for enforcing narcotics laws systematically violated citizens civil rights, stole money and drugs, planted evidence on suspects, fabricated the legal basis for search and seizure warrants, committed perjury, and used excessive force on suspects.
The revelations of this ongoing corruption erupted into one of the most damaging scandals in the history of the Philadelphia Police Department. In 1995, six 39th District officers were jailed. Several hundred criminal convictions resulting from these officer’s activities were overturned and thousands more scrutinized. Millions of dollars were spent settling civil rights lawsuits stemming from these unlawful activities. Intense media coverage of this scandal severely eroded public confidence in the integrity of its police force and hindered law enforcement and prosecution efforts in the city.
The repercussions of the 39th District scandal persist. The city continues to settle civil rights lawsuits initiated as a result of the corrupt actions of the 39th District officers, prior criminal convictions involving these officers continue to be scrutinized and challenged, and residual public wariness of the integrity of its police force still exists.
In the aftermath of the 39th District scandal, in 1996 the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and the Police-Barrio Relations Project filed a lawsuit in federal court alleging that widespread and pervasive systemic deficiencies in the Philadelphia Police Department contributed to the ongoing cycle of scandals that plagued the Department.
Rather than litigate, the City of Philadelphia entered into a Settlement Agreement with the Plaintiffs that set forth a comprehensive plan for reform in the Philadelphia Police Department. The goal of this Agreement is to minimize and deter police corruption and misconduct to the greatest extent possible, and thereby enhance public confidence in the Philadelphia Police Department.
The Integrity and Accountability Office
To assist in meeting this goal, the Agreement created a permanent Integrity & Accountability Office to monitor and audit Departmental policies, practices, and operations as they relate to the detection and control of misconduct and corruption in the Department and if necessary, to make recommendations for change. In order to effectuate the broad duties of the Office, the IAO at its discretion, can initiate studies and audits, has access to virtually all Department records and personnel, and can make its findings public.
Since its inception, the IAO has had the access and independence necessary to carry out its responsibilities, has released several reports covering a broad range of issues, and has presented recommendations – some of which have been implemented by the Police Department.
By virtue of its essential function to monitor and audit the Police Department, and in order to remain effective and credible, the IAO must exercise independent judgment in reporting findings and making recommendations. This independence also means that the IAO analyses, critiques, and recommendations are solely those of the IAO. This report should not be interpreted as expressing the policies or positions of the government of the City of Philadelphia, or the opinions, views or beliefs of the Mayor, the Police Commissioner, the City Solicitor, or any other official of the City of Philadelphia.
Section VI of the Settlement Agreement charges the IAO with oversight and auditing functions related to the Department’s narcotics enforcement operations. (See Appendix A). Particular emphasis on oversight of this area of law enforcement is based on a broad range of misconduct that has historically been associated with narcotics enforcement including, but not limited to, violating civil rights, theft, excessive force, drug use, perjury, planting evidence, accepting bribes, cooperating with drug dealers, or violating any number of Departmental directives and policies*
To fulfill the mandate of the Settlement Agreement the IAO spent much of the past year (in conjunction with its other ongoing monitoring functions) conducting a comprehensive audit and assessment of the policies, practices, and operations of the Narcotics Bureau** and other interrelated units of the Philadelphia Police Department. This report presents the findings and recommendations pertaining to that study.
_________________
*The 39th District scandal
was only one of several scandals arising from the enforcement of narcotics
laws. In 1989, officers from the
Department’s elite 5-Squad narcotics unit were involved in widespread theft of
money and drugs and extortion. Four 5-Squad
officers were eventually convicted of federal racketeering and conspiracy
charges.
**After the 39th District
scandal, individual districts were banned from enforcing narcotics laws. In 1999, the Department re-established
district level enforcement of narcotics laws through Narcotics Enforcement
Teams (NETS) which are comprised of approximately five to seven officers and a
supervisor who focus on open street sales.
NETS are not authorized to conduct long-term drug investigations,
utilize search and seizure warrants or confidential informants, conduct direct
buys or reversal stings or other more complex investigative techniques such as
those used in the Narcotics Bureau.
The original
scope of this audit included NETS operations.
As this project progressed, however, it became apparent that the scope
of the study was unwieldy in light of IAO resources. The IAO’s preliminary
findings, along with its ongoing monitoring of Internal Affairs investigations,
identified problems related to record keeping practices and other integrity
issues with some district NETS. The IAO
intends to conduct a separate in-depth study of district NETS operations.
Basis for Findings
The findings and recommendations contained in this report are based upon the IAO’s review and analysis of the following:
1. Written Departmental policies and directives which guide the Narcotics Bureau operations;
2. Departmental policies and practices related to the personnel selection process for the Narcotics Bureau, and review of the Internal Affairs Bureau (“IAB”), discipline, and other pertinent employment records of Narcotics Bureau personnel;
3. Training provided to Narcotics Bureau personnel;
4. All completed IAB investigations generated as a result of Narcotics Bureau activities from 1997 through July 1, 2002;
5. Review of all internally generated audits and reports and other internal Departmental monitoring practices related to narcotics enforcement activities since 1997 that the IAO was able to identify.
6. Narcotics Bureau supervisory oversight policies and practices;
7. Internal Affairs use of force and firearms discharge databases for all reported force incidents generated as a result of Narcotics Bureau activities from January 1, 1997 to May, 2002;
8. Disciplinary actions initiated against Narcotics Bureau personnel in general, and specifically in cases where the IAB investigations sustained allegations of misconduct;
9. Lawsuits generated as a result of narcotics enforcement activities from January 1, 1993 to July 1, 2002;
10. Review of databases maintained by the Narcotics Bureau Management Information Systems Unit;
11. Review of the operations, databases, and reports of the Narcotics Bureau Integrity Control Office (ICO) including the confidential informant and search warrant databases, and the annual ICO search and seizure warrant reports from January 1, 1998 to December 31, 2001;
12. Review of approximately two hundred and fifty search and seizure warrants and supporting affidavits of probable cause executed in 1999, 2000, and 2001 by the Narcotics Field Units;
13. Records of targeted and random urinalysis tests results conducted on Narcotics Bureau personnel from January 1, 1996 to December 31, 2001;
14. Municipal Court databases for all 1999 and 2000 disposed municipal level narcotics cases and review of approximately five hundred Municipal Court case files in which the narcotics arrests were dismissed/discharged;
15. Review of Common Pleas Court case records to determine the disposition of nearly 1,800 narcotics arrests;
16. Review of approximately three hundred and fifty arrest/discovery files maintained by the Narcotics Strike Force and Narcotic Field Units;
17. Departmental policies and practices related to the use and management of confidential informants and an audit of approximately one hundred confidential informant files maintained by the Narcotics Field Units;
18. Direct observation of the execution of numerous search and seizure warrants, undercover surveillances, arrests, and vehicle and pedestrian investigations conducted by Narcotics Bureau officers and supervisors.
19. More than two
dozen interviews with Philadelphia Police Department Narcotics Bureau
personnel, narcotics officers and agents from other state and Federal drug
enforcement agencies, and experts in the area of narcotics enforcement not
affiliated with the Philadelphia Police Department.
20. An extensive
interview with a former Philadelphia police officer who was dismissed from the
force and jailed for criminal activities related to narcotics enforcement.
Assessing the extent to which narcotics enforcement operations are conducted legally, ethically, and within the Philadelphia Police Department guidelines is hindered by the obvious fact that only in the most unusual of circumstances do officers intentionally reveal or document their misdeeds. To overcome this hurdle, the IAO undertook a three-prong approach to this study:
1. First, to find evidence of existing or emerging patterns indicative of improper or illegal narcotics enforcement practices we reviewed available information sources, records, and databases documenting Narcotics Bureau activities, investigations by the IAB into specific allegations of misconduct arising from narcotics enforcement activities, and other internal studies and audits initiated by the Department to assess the integrity of the Narcotics Bureau.
2. Second, the IAO examined written Department policies related to narcotics enforcement operations to determine whether they reflected best practices. The IAO then conducted extensive study and observation of Narcotics Bureau operations to determine the extent to which these policies are actually practiced. Formal written policies, no matter how ideal they may appear on their face, are meaningless if they are ignored or circumvented.
3. Third, the IAO conducted dozens of interviews and spent considerable time
in the field with officers, supervisors, and commanders responsible for narcotics enforcement efforts to better understand the realities and complexities of their jobs. Due to the unique issues surrounding narcotics enforcement, we found it necessary to expand the scope of our interviews to include other local agencies in the criminal justice system as well as other State and Federal law enforcement agencies responsible for enforcing narcotics laws.
Aftermath of the 39th District Scandal
In the
aftermath of the 39th District scandal, Departmental efforts to
combat drug trafficking in Philadelphia were significantly curtailed. Police districts were banned from narcotics
enforcement activities and exclusive jurisdiction for narcotics enforcement was
centralized in what was then called the Special Investigations Bureau
(SIB). The SIB was understaffed and ill
equipped to dismantle the hundreds of open air drug markets that were operating
around the clock. Years of lax enforcement enabled drug trafficking
organizations to develop strongholds in Philadelphia neighborhoods and
established Philadelphia as a narcotics “source” city with some of the purest
and cheapest narcotics in the nation.
Philadelphia experienced an alarming increase in drug related homicides
and other crimes at a time when other major cities in the nation were reporting
decreases in their crime rates.
In 1997, significant community and political pressure was brought to bear on the Department for its lack of focus on the drug problem and its devastating impact on individuals and communities throughout the city. In response, the Department dramatically increased its narcotics enforcement efforts. In 1997, SIB was renamed the Narcotics Bureau and over the next five years experienced a 140% increase in sworn personnel. Narcotics arrests increased Department-wide by nearly 200%. (See Table 1)
Table 1
Year #
Officers assigned to #
Narcotics Arrests by Total
Narcotics Arrests
Narcotics Bureau Narcotics Bureau Department-Wide
1996 250 not available not available
1997 251 not available 8,682
1998 415 6,224 19,210
1999 451 7,901 22,613
2000 577 9,837 23,852
2001 601* 11,229 24,845
*Approximately
seventy officers assigned to the Narcotics Bureau are detailed out to various
interagency drug task forces which include, among others, the Drug Enforcement
Agency, and the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office. While these officers
are still under the jurisdiction of the Philadelphia Police Department, they
are not under the direct supervision of the Department on a daily basis. The
Narcotics Bureau also has a City Wide Vice Unit that is responsible for
enforcing laws related to gambling, prostitution, and liquor sales. An average of thirty sworn personnel who are
currently assigned to the Narcotics Bureau are detailed to the Vice Unit. For purposes of this study we focused solely
on the narcotics enforcement operations of the Bureau.
Some of this upsurge in activity was attributable to “Operation Sunrise” - a coordinated effort by several city agencies beginning in 1998 to address drug trafficking and other quality of life issues in some of the city’s most drug besieged communities. In May 2002, the Department rolled out “Operation Safe Streets”- another major narcotics enforcement initiative in which hundreds of uniformed officers were redeployed to the city’s drug dealing hot spots in an attempt to disrupt narcotics trafficking. Arrests and seizures have significantly increased since the inception of Operation Safe Streets.
Narcotics Bureau Mission and Organizational
Structure
The Mission Statement of the Narcotics Bureau stipulates that its objective is:
“To
aggressively enforce City and State laws related to narcotics through overt and
covert investigations designed to identify, disrupt and eliminate the
activities of criminal organizations specifically engaged in drug trafficking. The Narcotics Bureau employs uniformed and
non-uniformed officers as well as local, state and federal task force personnel
in both short and long term investigations.
The objective is to secure intelligence information, gather evidence,
effect arrests, and assist in the successful prosecution of offenders. It is the goal of the Bureau to aggressively
attack the purveyors of these illegal activities on a daily basis through a
comprehensive approach in an effort to stabilize and secure our neighborhoods
and enhance the quality of life for members of the community”
The Narcotics
Bureau has undergone several reorganizations since 1997. Currently, the Narcotics Bureau is comprised
of the following units located at facilities throughout the city:
Narcotics Strike Force (“NSF”) – The purpose of the NSF is to eradicate open street sales of narcotics using both uniform patrol with covert surveillance operations, and to assist other Narcotics Bureau units and agencies with a uniformed presence in narcotics investigations.
Narcotics Field Units (“NFU”) –There
are currently three NFU’s that concentrate on specified geographic areas in the
City. The NFU’s are comprised of
plainclothes/undercover personnel who focus on indoor sales locations. NFU’s are authorized to conduct longer term
investigations than the district Narcotics Enforcement Teams and the Narcotics
Strike Force, and to utilize a variety of investigative techniques such as
acting as narcotics buyers (so-called “buy-busts” and sellers (so-called “reverse
stings”), surveillances, confidential informants, and search and seizure
warrants. In 2000, each NFU established
a Violence Response Team (VRT) comprised of approximately seven to nine
undercover officers who are deployed to locations experiencing a surge of
violent incidents believed to be drug related.
Narcotics Intelligence and Investigation Unit (NIIU) - The NIIU gathers, analyzes, and disseminates intelligence regarding drug-related criminal organizations, conducts investigations leading to the forfeiture of criminal proceeds,
provides specialized technical support to other Narcotics Bureau units, and coordinates Philadelphia police resources in federal, state and local task force initiatives combating drug trafficking.
TRENDS AND PATTERNS IN
EXISTING DATA
Information Sources
The IAO reviewed and analyzed the following six major sources of data to assess the existence or extent of improper or illegal narcotics enforcement practices:
1. Records of lawsuits and Settlement Recommendations prepared by the Law Department of the City of Philadelphia (“Litigation”).
2. IAB investigations of the activities of the Narcotics Bureau.
3. The
Philadelphia Police Department’s records regarding “Use of Force” and
“Shootings”.
4. Court attendance records of narcotics officers maintained by the Police Department.
5. Philadelphia Municipal and Common Pleas Court records regarding the disposition of narcotics arrests.
6.
Departmental
studies and audits of Narcotics Bureau operations.
Litigation
The IAO examined lawsuits filed against the Police Department by individuals who claimed that their rights were in some way violated as a result of narcotics enforcement activities. These litigation records offer valuable insight and evidence into the extent to which narcotics officers are operating within the bounds of the law and Departmental policy. The IAO analyzed all cases that were settled between January 1, 1993 and December 31, 2001, in which the City incurred financial liability as a result of Department wide narcotics enforcement activities, and not just those lawsuits which were the result of Narcotics Bureau activities. This review and analysis also did not include active/open lawsuits, or suits that were closed without payment or dismissed for a variety of reasons.
The IAO’s attempts to identify all lawsuits resulting from narcotics enforcement activities proved to be problematic. First, the Department does not maintain consistent, detailed, and centralized records regarding civil rights litigation involving police personnel. Therefore it was necessary to rely upon a computerized case management system maintained by the Civil Rights Unit of the City’s Law Department.
Second, the IAO conducted a more detailed review of all Settlement Recommendations prepared by the Law Department, which set forth the facts of the case and the reasons for settlement. In both the databases and Recommendations of Settlement, information provided was frequently vague. These records did not always contain the involved officer’s name, payroll number, and district/unit of assignment at the time of the alleged misconduct. As demonstrated in Table 2, factual descriptions of the alleged misconduct were also extremely vague. This made it extremely difficult to determine whether some lawsuits were the result of narcotics enforcement activities. (The IAO identified over thirty narcotics related lawsuits that were not provided to us by the Law Department in our request for this information.)
For these reasons, the statistics included in Tables 3 through 6* cannot be considered to be comprehensive. However the IAO is confident that they do represent the vast majority of lawsuits initiated as a result of narcotics activities over the time period studied.
Table 2
EXAMPLES OF VAGUE CASE
DESCRIPTIONS IN CIVIL RIGHTS DATABASE
·
“Plaintiff claims police
subjected him to excessive force”.
·
“Plaintiff claims police
threw him to the ground them kicked him in the face as
they entered his residence to serve a search and seizure warrant.”
·
“Plaintiff claims police falsely arrested and
improperly searched her and seized
her money.”
·
“Plaintiff claims he was
subjected to excessive force and illegal search and seizure.
·
“Plaintiff claims he was
sitting on the steps of his home when, without cause or
justification, he was stopped and seized by police officers.”
·
“Plaintiff claims police
forced their way into his home, handcuffed him and falsely
arrested him.”
·
“Plaintiff was arrested
during an incident”
·
“Plaintiff was stopped
in his car by plainclothes police in an unmarked car and
beaten.”
·
“Plaintiff’s house was
searched by Police.”
·
“Plaintiff states the police
caused him to be the recipient of civil rights violations
and property damage because of false arrest.”
·
“Plaintiff states he
received injuries during an incident with police”
____________________________
*These Tables were originally compiled by Law Department personnel and
subsequently modified by the IAO.
Table 3
Year # of Narcotics Total Amount of Settlements
Cases
Settled
1993 3 $571,000.00
1994 2 $147,000.00
1995 8 $323,500.00
1996* 39 $4,143,048.00
1997 17 $812,000.00
1998 10 $682,000.00
1999 15 $363,500.00
2000 7 $313,500.00
2001 14 $350,000.00
_______________________________________________________
9 years 115 cases $7,706,048**
*Many of the 39th District
lawsuits were settled this year.
**$4,025,440 (52%) of the total
settlement costs resulted from 39th District cases.
Table 4
Nature of complaint* # of Times Alleged
Excessive Force/Assault/Battery 53
False arrest 49
Illegal search and seizure/illegal entry 19
False imprisonment 16
Failure to train, discipline, and
supervise 14
Malicious prosecution 12
Fabrication of evidence (incl. Planting
drugs)/false police reports 7
Theft 5
Damage to Property 3
Fabrication of probable cause to support
affidavit for search warrant 4
Improper strip search 3
Intentional infliction of emotional
distress 2
Lack of probable cause to support
affidavit for search warrant 2
Failure to provide necessary medical
care 1
Perjury 1
Freedom of speech violation 1
Violation of PA. Unfair Trade Practices
Consumer Protection Law 1
Loss of consortium 1
* Many cases set forth more than
one complaint.
Table 5
Total number of
officers involved and the number of suits in
which each
officer was a named defendant.
2 officers were defendants in 18 cases each (39th District officers)
1 officer was a defendant in 10 cases (39th District officer)
2 officers were defendants in 6 cases each (39th District officers)
3 officers were defendants in 4 cases each
3 officers were defendants in 3 cases each
8 officers were defendants in 2 cases each
126 officers were defendants in 1 case each
_________________
Total
145 officers
Table 6
Reasons for Settlement* No.
Too
costly to proceed to trial 34
Officer(s)
had prior IAD complaints and/or convictions 27
Strong
evidence of physical/mental injury of plaintiff/s 19
Plausible
plaintiff(s)/ strong witnesses 17
Evidence
of officer(s) misconduct 9
Inconsistent
statements/versions of officer(s) 8
Difficulty
obtaining evidence/witnesses to support City’s defense 7
Concern
that publicity surrounding 39th District would affect outcome 6
Concern
of malicious prosecution claim 6
Plaintiff(s)
had no or insignificant prior criminal history 6
Lack of
police paperwork for case 5
Concern
that jury would award large amount because of length of incarceration 4
Weak
affidavit of probable cause 4
Police
reports do not corroborate with officer(s) account(s) 3
Excessive
property damage 2
Officer(s)
admission of lack of probable cause to arrest 2
Significant
number of convictions involving an officer were discarded 2
Concern
that jury would find officer(s) did not insure appropriate medical care 1
Lack of
reasonable suspicion to frisk 1
Officer(s)
repeated failure to appear to testify 1
Repeated
arrests by same officer – evidence of harassment 1
Officer’s
failure to obtain search warrant weakened City’s defense 1
Plaintiff
not criminally charged 1
Finding
of exculpatory evidence in favor of Plaintiff 1
Concern
of appearance/accusation of racial bias 1
* Many cases set forth more than one reason for
settlement
Interpretation and
Analysis of Litigation Data
Litigation data must be interpreted with caution. Whether a lawsuit is settled does not necessarily mean that the police action was improper. Various factors impact on the decision to settle a case, including the cost of trial and trial preparation. In our society, litigation costs are unavoidable. It would be impossible as a practical matter to completely eliminate settlement or verdict costs; the point is to analyze information to try to minimize those costs.
With the exception of the 39th District cases, the IAO review of the litigation records did not indicate any patterns or trends of police misconduct in narcotics enforcement activities either by unit or officer. In a few cases, important policy and integrity issues were implicated and serious injuries/damages were sustained which justified significant settlements. In a large percentage of the cases however, the circumstances surrounding the allegations, and the subsequent settlement amounts, indicated that many of the claims were relatively minor.
This study underscores the need for improved coordination between the Law Department and the Police Department related to lawsuits filed against police personnel. Additionally, the Department would benefit from the creation of its own litigation database involving police personnel that should include necessary data fields such as the officer(s) name and payroll number(s), the date of incident, the unit/district/squad to which the involved officer(s) were assigned at the time of the alleged incidents, the allegations, and in physical abuse claims - the type of force used and a description of the injuries sustained. This information would enable the Police Department to identify emerging patterns or problems related to a particular officer, squad, or unit which could trigger proactive responses and prevent potential litigation - at great savings to the taxpayers of this City.*
Additionally, such information would be readily accessible when an officer is being considered for assignment to specialized and sensitive units, such as the Narcotics Bureau. We identified two lawsuits against officers for actions taken prior to their assignment to the Narcotics Bureau which would have been relevant in assessing these officers’ suitability for the Narcotics Bureau.**
________________________
* For example, one lawsuit involved
several narcotics officers who used force against a civilian who was injured
but not arrested. The injured person’s
name does not appear anywhere in the police reports, IAB was never notified of
the force incident as required by Departmental policy, and no IAB investigation
into the incident occurred. The injured civilian filed a civil rights lawsuit
and the case settled for $12,500. In
this case numerous Departmental policies were violated, yet none of the
involved officers or supervisors were held accountable.
**Because judicial economy and avoidance
of costs may be factors in the decision to settle a lawsuit, settlement does
not in and of itself mean that the officer committed any wrongdoing. In light of the fact that a record of
lawsuits may appear in an officer’s employment history, an explanation of the
reason for the settlement should be made part of the officer’s record so that
the officer is not unfairly stigmatized or penalized.
IAB Investigations
In addition to the IAO’s ongoing review of all IAB investigations, for this study a detailed examination was conducted of all IAB investigations, arising from Narcotics Bureau activities that were completed between January 1, 1999 and July 1, 2002. Since newly completed investigations are regularly reviewed by the IAO, these statistics were updated throughout the duration of this study. At the time of this writing IAB had approximately fourteen active/open Complaints Against Police (“CAP’s”) and eleven active/open “internal”* investigations arising from Narcotics Bureau activities.
A statistical breakdown of these investigations is presented in Tables 7 and 8.
Table 7
IAB Investigations of the Narcotics Bureau Completed in 1999-2001
CAP’s INTERNAL’s
1999
27 19
2000
30 20
2001
9 13
Total 66 52
_________________________
*“CAP” investigations are initiated when a
citizen files a complaint alleging some type of police misconduct. These investigations may be reviewed by the
public. “Internal” investigations are
initiated by the IAB and they are not available for public review.
Table 8
Allegations and Conclusions/Completed IAB
Investigations 1999- July 2001
|
Allegations* |
Total |
Exonerated |
Unfounded |
Not Sustained |
Sustained |
Closed Without
finding |
Other Conclusion |
|
Excessive
Force |
30 |
13 |
3 |
10 |
0 |
2 |
2-within guidelines |
|
Verbal Abuse |
17 |
2 |
2 |
11 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
|
Off Duty (see
below) |
16 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
0 |
2- w/drawn by CW. 1-w/drawn by IAD. 2 -Dept. violations. |
|
Other (see
below) |
31 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
14 |
1 |
1-closed w/out merit 1-no wrongdoing found 2-referred to FBI 1-Field test reliable |
|
Illegal/improper Detention/search/seizure |
17 |
11 |
0 |
4 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
|
False Arrest |
17 |
8 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
2-w/drawn by IAD |
|
Theft |
10 |
3 |
2 |
3 |
2 |
|
0 |
|
Improper
Search and Seizure Warrant |
3 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
|
Property
Damage |
5 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
|
Associating
with drug dealers/criminals |
8 |
0 |
4 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
1- refer to FBI |
|
Releasing
Confidential Information |
4 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|
Lack of Service |
3 |
2 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|
Total
Allegations |
161 |
45 |
18 |
46 |
29 |
8 |
15 |
*Numerous investigations contain more
than one allegation of misconduct
SUSTAINED – The investigation proved that the complainant’s allegations occurred and that officer’s actions were inconsistent with Departmental policy, directives, disciplinary code, or applicable local, state, or federal law.
NOT SUSTAINED - IAB investigation can neither prove nor disprove the allegation.
UNFOUNDED - The alleged incident did not occur.
EXONERATED - The acts alleged did in fact occur, but the officer’s actions were proper, lawful, and in accordance with Departmental policy.
WITHDRAWN - The complainant voluntarily withdraws complaint.
DEPARTMENTAL VIOLATIONS - The investigation uncovered infractions of Departmental rules, directives, or procedures.
REFERRED TO - Internal Affairs completed their investigation and referred the information to another unit or agency (city, state, or federal) for further investigation.
INACTIVE STATUS - The complainant will not consent to an IAB interview due to a pending court proceeding. The investigation will be reopened when the court proceedings are concluded.
CLOSED WITHOUT FINDINGS - The complainant does not cooperate with the investigation and the investigator made reasonable efforts to obtain cooperation.
A more detailed breakdown of the “off-duty”
allegations/incidents is provided below:
5 - Domestic violence - 2 not sustained, 1
frivolous, 2 sustained
2 - Unprofessional conduct by officer after auto accidents
– Departmental
violations on both
1 - Unauthorized outside employment - sustained
1 - Hit and run – sustained
1 - Officer family member selling drugs from officer’s
home – unfounded
1 - Theft – withdrawn by complainant
1 - Insurance fraud - sustained
1 - Threats – not sustained
1 - Harassment – withdrawn by complainant
1 - Allegation that officer is a drug dealer – Withdrawn
by the IAB. Complainant
clearly unstable.
1 - Violation of Department use of force policy –
sustained
1 – Allegations of verbal abuse, threats, associating with
known criminals, and failing to cooperate and lying during Departmental
investigation against one officer - all allegations sustained.
Allegations classified as “other” in
Table 8 include the following:
5 - Harassment – 2
not sustained, 1 closed without
merit, 2 unfounded
2 - Improper issuance of traffic tickets – 1 exonerated, 1 sustained
2 - Excessive payments to confidential informants – 1 not sustained, 1 sustained
2 Failure to cooperate with and lying during
Departmental investigation - 2
sustained
2 - Criminal activity- referred to FBI (due to extreme
sensitivity of these investigations, the allegations cannot be disclosed)
2 - Threats – 1 unfounded,
1 sustained
2 - Abuse of authority – 1 sustained, 1 not
sustained
1 - False entry on Daily Attendance Report – sustained
1 - Failure to patrol – sustained
1 - Sudden death of civilian during search of home– no
wrongdoing by officers involved
1 - False overtime requests – not sustained
1 - Impersonating an IAB officer - sustained
1 - Leaving scene of accident – not sustained
1 - Narcotics use by officer – not sustained
1 - Loss of seized narcotic evidence - sustained
1 - Watching pornography during execution of a search
warrant - sustained
1 - Failure to prepare property receipt - sustained
1 - Failure of supervisor to review strip search
reports – sustained
1 - Investigation into reliability of field test
1 – Allegation that narcotics officer is selling stolen
firearms – Complainant fails to cooperate.
Investigation is “Closed without findings”.
Analysis of IAB Data
Overall, the IAB investigations appear to be thorough and unbiased. With few exceptions, IAB investigators conducted complete investigations regardless of the source of the complaint (i.e. complainant was anonymous, incarcerated, a convicted felon, a chronic complaint filer, etc.), obtained the necessary evidence and records, conducted interviews with relevant witnesses, and reached conclusions that were reasonable and consistent with the evidence.
No persistent patterns of misconduct by any particular unit, squad, or officer were identified. However, some investigations revealed serious integrity issues related to particular officers, and violations of specific Departmental policies, particularly as it relates to confidential informants, evidence control, supervisory oversight, and execution of search warrants, that will be addressed in greater detail later in the Report.
The IAO remains satisfied that, overall, the IAB continues to effectively fulfill its critical role as the Department’s internal investigator of specified allegations of misconduct and corruption. However, the following weaknesses should be noted:
· Some of the IAB investigations indicated that violations of Departmental policies regarding the proper execution of search and seizure warrants, questionable or poorly articulated legal basis for detentions and arrests, or possible improprieties in the scope of some searches may have occurred, yet these issues were not always examined or addressed in the investigations.
These oversights indicate a need for the IAB investigators to receive additional training in legal and Departmental standards related to searches and seizures, and/or stronger emphasis on the IAB investigators’ responsibility to fully explore these issues.
· Extensive delays exist in completing IAB investigations. Executive Order 9-93, (a 1993 Mayoral decree that establishes Departmental guidelines for investigations into citizen complaints against police) requires that IAB complete CAP investigations within seventy-five days after receipt of the complaint. We reviewed only five out of approximately sixty-five Narcotics Bureau CAP investigations that were completed within the mandated time period. Some investigations took over a year, and others, several years, to complete. Most troubling were those investigations in which serious corruption allegations against active narcotics officers and supervisors remain unresolved for months.
IAB backlogs have been and continue to be a serious problem. The IAO has addressed this issue in prior reports and noted that numerous factors contribute to delays, some of which are beyond the control of the IAB. (See: IAO First Monitoring Report, November 1997). Regardless of the causes, these delays have widespread negative implications and are stressful for the officers against whom investigations are pending. The backlog decreases public confidence in the Department as months elapse without any resolution of complaints. Finally, extensive delays threaten to adversely impact the integrity of the investigation process as evidence and witnesses can be lost to time or indifference.
It is imperative that the IAB investigation requirements, established nearly a decade ago, be re-evaluated and that the Department, in conjunction with other relevant agencies, such as the District Attorney’s Office*, devise solutions to get a handle on the critical backlog problem.
· The following inconsistencies, ambiguities, and errors were identified in both investigative conclusions and the IAB database:
1. As indicated in Table 8, the majority of “sustained” allegations are classified into the ambiguous and catchall category of “other”. These investigations tend to implicate more serious integrity allegations. Yet, because the IAB’s categorical breakdown of allegations is limited, the database is not particularly useful in assessing the types of misconduct that the IAB has investigated without review of the investigative files.
2. Citizens initiating complaints against police may subsequently refuse to cooperate in the ensuing IAB investigations. In some of these cases, the IAB terminated the investigation as “closed without findings” due to lack of cooperation by the complainant. In other investigations involving non-cooperative complainants, the IAB either concluded that the allegations were “not-sustained” “exonerated” or “unfounded”. The IAO could not identify standards or guidelines for determining the IAB’s course of action in these circumstances.
3. In several “internally” generated use of force investigations*, the IAB reached conclusions about whether the officer used
_________________
*IAB
cannot interview the target officer until the District Attorney’ Office has
formally informed the Department that it does not intend to pursue criminal
charges against the target officer.
Many active IAB investigations languish for months waiting for the
District Attorney’s determination in these cases.
**Use of force investigations are
initiated in at least two ways. In the
first instance, a civilian files a complaint against police (CAP) alleging
physical abuse. The IAB is mandated to fully investigate every CAP,
regardless of the allegation. In other
cases, Departmental policy requires that the IAB be notified of specified force
incidents. After review of a force
notification, the IAB may unilaterally decide to initiate an “internal” force
investigation into the incident to determine whether the use of force was
reasonable and justified. In 2001 for example, the IAB initiated approximately
37 internal use of force investigations.
Injured suspects rarely cooperate with “internal” force investigations.
excessive force despite the fact that no excessive force allegation was made. In these cases, the IAB investigation should determine whether or not the use of force was reasonable, justified, and within Departmental guidelines. For example, after being notified per Departmental policy that a suspect sustained a head injury during a narcotics arrest, the IAB initiated an investigation to assess whether the force used was warranted, reasonable and within Departmental guidelines. The IAB investigation concluded, “The allegation that the [officers] used excessive force is ‘Unfounded’. The defendant’s attempts to resist arrest, by fleeing and then assaulting the officer, caused himself and the officer to receive injuries”. Since there was no allegation of excessive force, this conclusion is inappropriate and unfairly stigmatizes the officer.
4. The IAB investigated a narcotics officer for associating with, and tipping off, a known drug dealer about the dealer’s impending arrest for aggravated assault. During his interview with the IAB, the drug dealer admitted to being informed by the narcotics officer that the he was wanted for the assault. The IAB investigative conclusion was “closed without findings”, and the IAB database entry indicated that the officer was “Exonerated” of these allegations.
5.
In a CAP alleging illegal arrest and search, the
investigation was both “closed without finding” due to lack of cooperation by
complainant and the targeted officers “exonerated” of the allegations. The IAB database entry for this same
investigation indicates that the allegation of an illegal search was
“sustained”. In another CAP alleging
excessive force the investigation was both “Closed without Findings Due
to Lack of Cooperation by Complainant” and “Not Sustained”.
Use of Force
To assess the extent to which force has been used by Narcotics Bureau officers, the IAO examined the Department’s “use of force” and “shooting” databases, which are summarized in Tables 9 and 10, and the “use of force” investigations, including shootings, completed by the IAB from 1998-2001. In a 1999 report issued by the IAO, numerous deficiencies in the Department’s use of force reporting, tracking, and investigative policies and practices were documented. Since that time, the Department has undertaken numerous reforms to improve the problems identified. However, the following examples are evidence that under-reporting, inaccuracies, and ambiguities in use of force reporting and monitoring persist:
·
The IAO identified several IAB investigations in which
force was used against a suspect who required medical treatment, yet these
force incidents did not appear on the officer’s use of force history.
· Two audits conducted by the IAB found that in a two month period in 2000 and 2001, eighty-one force incidents had not been reported to the IAB per Departmental policy. The IAO was unable to ascertain from these audits precisely which units in the Department failed to report the force incidents. These audits confirm that the force database is incomplete.
· In some force incidents, several officers may be present, but only one officer actually used the force. In these situations, the database indicates that each officer present used the force indicated. In one case for example, three narcotics officers were on the scene when OC (pepper) Spray was used on a suspect, yet only one narcotics officer actually used the spray. The database entry for this incident indicates that all three officers used OC Spray. Conversely, there were several cases in which more than one narcotics officer was directly involved in a force incident, yet the database entries identified only one of the involved officers as using force.
· The types of force used most frequently by Philadelphia police officers, including narcotics officers, include pushing, shoving, tackling, punching, kicking, grabbing etc. However, these different forms of force are subsumed under the catchall category of “other”. Thus the existing force database does not reflect the reality and particularities of the force used by narcotics officers.
· The IAO identified data base entries where descriptions of the force used were too vague (i.e. “passive restraint” “control holds” “subdue” “physically subdued”). In some cases the IAO could not ascertain the severity of the injuries because of uninformative descriptions (i.e. “injuries to arm and face” “injury to mouth” “injured face” “injury rib-stomach” “laceration to head”).
· In each of the following examples the database indicated that “no force” was used, yet the suspect sustained injuries that appear to be force related:
-“Suspect injured when he “scraped head on brick wall while being
frisked.”
-“Defendant transported to hospital for rib injury sustained while
being helped to feet.”
-“Defendant “struggled” with police and sustained stitches over left
eye.”
-Defendant “tried to escape and sustained lacerations to face and
head.”
-Defendant exited vehicle with box cutter and was “put to the
ground” sustaining injuries to lip and eye.
-Defendant “acted aggressively and OC Spray was used”.
-Defendant fled police, cut right arm and “received injury when
officer put handcuffs on defendant.”
-Defendant “attempted to strike officer and received a cut to the
head.”
-Defendant was tackled while fleeing and suffered sprained ankle.
-Defendant “received injury during arrest”
Therefore it is not possible to conclude that the use of force statistics presented in Table 10 are either comprehensive or accurate. However, there is a system of checks and balances within the Department which, along with citizen accessibility to the civilian complaint process and the legal system, offer assurances that serious force incidents do not escape detection with any regularity.
Table 9
Firearms Discharges-Narcotics Bureau
|
Year |
# shootings |
# officers involved |
NIIU |
NSF |
NFU North |
NFU East |
NFU South |
Special Invest. |
Violations Found |
No Violations |
Miscellaneous |
|
1999 |
14 |
20 |
2 |
3 |
2 |
3 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
15 |
2
-unfounded |
|
2000 |
10 |
13 |
2 |
1 |
4 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
9 |
0 |
|
2001 |
11 |
15 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
7-open
investigations |
|
Total |
35 |
48 |
5 |
8 |
11 |
4 |
3 |
3 |
7 |
29 |
9 |
Table 10
Reported Use of Force Incidents - Narcotics
Bureau 1998-2001*
|
Unit/Year |
Total use of force
Incidents Reported to IAD |
“Other” (includes tackles, punches, kicks,
struggles, etc.) |
OC Spray |
Baton |
Not Indicated |
Taser |
Blackjack |
|
NSF |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1998 |
9 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
|
1999 |
24 |
1 |
9 |
2 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
|
2000 |
28 |
15 |
9 |
2 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
|
2001 |
60 |
46 |
10 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
NFU North |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1998 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
|
1999 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
|
2000 |
13 |
6 |
5 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
|
2001 |
16 |
13 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
NFU East |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1998 |
2 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|
1999 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|
2000 |
4 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
|
2001 |
22 |
19 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
NFU South |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1998 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|
1999 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
|
2000 |
6 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
|
2001 |
14 |
11 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
DEA Task Force |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1998 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|
1999 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|
2000 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|
2001 |
3 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
*In some force incidents, more than one
type of force was used.
Court Attendance
As the 39th District scandal unfolded it became evident that the officers who were implicated repeatedly failed to appear in court to testify in drug cases in which they had participated in the arrests or secured search warrants. This behavior was identified as a key indicator of misconduct and corruption. It can be inferred that these officers disregarded their court notices to avoid being effectively cross-examined in cases where they knew they had broken the law, or violated civil rights or Departmental policies. A pattern of failures to appear in court may also indicate that an officer is cooperating with drug dealers.
To assess whether any
similar patterns or practices related to court appearances were occurring in
the Narcotics Bureau, the IAO obtained information maintained by the Department
in a “Court Attendance” database.
Philadelphia police officers are provided identification cards with a
bar code identifier unique to each officer.
Whenever officers receive court notices to appear in court they are
required to “swipe” the card at the court attendance office to document their
arrival and departure times. This
enables the Department to monitor officers’ court attendance and overtime
costs. Supervisors are responsible for monitoring officer compliance with court
notices and ensuring that legitimate reasons for not appearing (such as being
on an “on-call” status, on vacation, sick, on funeral leave, or injured on duty),
are properly coded and entered into the database. Should an officer fail to appear in court and there is no
documented explanation in the database, then the officer’s absence is deemed
unauthorized.
At
the IAO’s request, the Department extracted from the Court Attendance database
a list of all Narcotics Bureau officers who failed to appear in court from
January 1, 1999 through June 30, 2002 - with no documented excuse. This inquiry
found that in that time period there
were 7,269 instances in which officers assigned to the Narcotics Bureau failed
to appear in court with no authorized or documented explanation for their
absences.
In discussing
these findings with pertinent Department personnel, the IAO was advised that
this problem is endemic to the entire Department and not simply the Narcotics
Bureau. One contributing factor is that
Philadelphia Court and Police Department databases operate independent of each
other. This results in countless police
subpoenas being issued by the courts where officers are not timely notified, or
on dates that officers are unable to appear.
According to police personnel, this results in excessive and unnecessary
police overtime costs, and inefficiencies in the court dockets as criminal
cases are repeatedly continued. Serious
consideration should be given to coordinating and integrating these related
databases.
However, the
entire problem cannot be attributed to technology. In a significant percentage of the above referenced cases,
narcotics officers were allegedly on “on-call’ status and were not required to
sign in at court attendance unless they were notified that their court case was
actually going forward that day. Rather than idle around the courthouse for
hours to attend court hearings that were never going to occur, these officers
were presumably conducting police business instead. While this may be a laudable use of resources, the failure of
supervisors to monitor and document court attendance of Narcotics Bureau officers
now precludes the Department from determining the legitimacy of over 7,000
cases in which officers failed to appear.
This is a critical oversight that should be
immediately rectified. (Note:
See Appendix B which documents remedial measures recently undertaken by the
Department to address problems related to court attendance identified in this
study.)
Narcotics Arrest Dispositions
Tracking the
disposition of narcotics arrests is another means of determining whether there
are patterns or trends indicative of police misconduct. For example, integrity
“red flags” should rise if the same officer has a record of case dismissals for
failing to appear in court, motions to suppress on similar grounds, and so
forth. However, the Philadelphia
Police Department does not track the status and disposition of its narcotics
arrests - or any arrests for that matter.
Apart from identifying misconduct or
corruption, tracking arrest dispositions would enable the Department to
evaluate the quality and efficacy of its operations, identify training and
management issues, and provide objective and meaningful information with which
to evaluate personnel for assignments and promotions. In discussing this issue with Department managers, the prevailing
attitude was that it is the Police Department’s responsibility to enforce the
laws and make arrests - after that the matter is out of the Department’s hands
and not their concern. Such
compartmentalizing seriously diminishes the effectiveness of law enforcement
efforts.
To circumvent this problem the IAO obtained a database from the Philadelphia Municipal Courts containing a list of all narcotics cases disposed of by the Municipal Courts during 1999 and 2000. This information was of limited value to our inquiry for several reasons. First, the courts do not collect data regarding case dispositions for the purpose of identifying trends or patterns related to police misconduct and some of the needed information was not in this database. Second, the database does not identify the arresting officer(s) or the unit or Bureau to which the arresting officer(s) were assigned at the time of the arrest. Thus, it was impractical to examine trends or patterns related specifically to the Narcotics Bureau. The database does provide the District Control number (DC#) for each arrest which facilitated identifying the police district in which the arrest occurred. Since the Narcotics Bureau was integrally connected with “Operation Sunrise,” which resulted in a significant number of narcotics arrests, the IAO concentrated on arrests that occurred in police districts where “Operation Sunrise” was focused.
In addition, the database was in some instances inaccurate. In numerous instances the database and actual “Quarter Sessions files” (“court files”) listed different dispositions for the same case. The following examples were the most frequently noted discrepancies:
·
The court’s database indicated “Dismissed/Discharged
Lack of Evidence” (“LOE”) while the court files indicated “Discharged Lack of
Prosecution” (“LOP”).
·
The court’s database indicated “Prosecution Withdrawn”
or “Prosecution Withdrawn/LOE”, while the court files indicated that the
defendant performed community service.
· The court’s database indicated “Prosecution Withdrawn LOE” or “Discharged/Dismissed” while the court files indicated that the felony narcotics charges were dismissed and the defendant pled guilty to the misdemeanor drug charges.
In light of the fact that
the court database does not specify the precise reasons for the dismissals, the
IAO examined the court files of over five hundred of the discharged cases. (See Table 11). In 263 (51%) of the court files reviewed, the reasons for the
discharges were inadequate, uninformative, or different from the database
entries for the same case. The
Department’s failure to monitor and track the disposition of narcotics arrests
and the ambiguities and errors identified in both the court’s database and
files precludes determining the precise reasons for the dismissals of a
significant percentage of narcotics cases.
The Municipal Court database only provides a partial picture of the disposition of narcotics cases in the Philadelphia courts. Under the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, a defendant who is charged with a felony first has a “preliminary hearing” in Municipal Court. At this hearing, a prosecutor must present a “preponderance of evidence” that the defendant did in fact commit the felony charged. If the prosecutor meets this legal burden, the defendant is held over for trial (“Held For Court”) in the Court of Common Pleas.
In 1999, the Municipal Courts, after conducting preliminary hearings, “Held for Court” 4,890 felony narcotics arrests that were sent off to the Courts of Common Pleas for final disposition. In 2000, the Municipal Courts, after conducting preliminary hearings, “Held for Court” 3,644 felony narcotics arrests that were sent off to the Courts of Common Pleas for final disposition. The IAO was unable to obtain a database from the Court of Common Pleas to determine the disposition of these 8,534 felony narcotics cases that were sent to the Common Pleas Courts, and locating the individual court files for review proved too cumbersome. Therefore it became necessary to rely on a police database that is linked to the court computer system to ascertain the disposition of a portion of these felony narcotics cases. The statistics of that review are presented in Table 12.
Review of
Discharged/Disposed Narcotics Cases by Municipal Courts
Total no. Reason for
Discharge/Dismissal
263 No clear
explanation. Final disposition simply
listed as Discharged “Lack of Prosecution” or “Lack of Evidence”, “Prosecution
Withdrawn by Commonwealth” or “Commonwealth Not Ready”
91 Community Service (listed as
“Withdrawn” on court database)
48 Guilty Plea (listed
as either “Discharged Lack of Evidence”, “Dismissed”, or “Prosecution
Withdrawn” on database)
31 Motion to Suppress Granted
25 Motion to Suppress per Rule 6013 Granted
(Speedy trial)
19 Discharged after
preliminary hearing – insufficient evidence
16 Officer failed to appear
12 Discovery incomplete
4 Defendant not transported from
prison to court
2 Defense deminimis – motion granted
1 Commonwealth could
not produce confidential informant
1 Withdrawn and consolidated
Total 513
Common Pleas Court Dispositions of Narcotics Cases “Held for Court”
# of Cases Disposition
331 Less than 1 year to 2 years
241 Probation*
219 Nolle Pros, disch./dism, Disch.LOP, Prosecution withdrawn
156 No Record Found
143 Sentence Indeterminate**
121 Bench Warrant Issued
101 Less than 6 months to max 1 year
88 Active/open
80 Less than 2 years to max 3 years
50 Section 17/ARD
40 Less than 3 years to max 4 years
40 Not Guilty
32 Less than 4 years to max 6 years
34 Less than 3 years to max 5 years
14 Less than 2 years to max 4 years
14 Less than 2 years to max 5 years
14 Pre-sentence Investigation
10 Less than 1 year to max 3 years
9 Abated (defendant died)
8 Discharged/ LOE after hearing
6 Less than 6 years to max 10
years
6 Sentence Suspended
4 Guilty – Sentence Deferred
4 Disposition unclear
4 Less than 5 years to max 8 years
3 Less than 4 years to max 7 years
3 Less than 5 years to max 10
years
3 Less than 10 years to max 20
years
2 0 to 11 months
2 Less than 3 years to max 10
years
2 Less than 1 year to max 5 years
1 Less than 6 years to max 15
years
1 Less than 8 years to max 14
years
1 Waiver, demurrer sustained
1 Transfer to Family Court
Total 1788
*Philadelphia probation officers are currently over-burdened with
caseloads of up to 250 probationers per officer. The degree of meaningful oversight, and the
deterrent effect of a sentence of probation, is questionable in light of the
magnitude of such a caseload. The IAO
reviewed hundreds of cases where drug dealers were repeatedly arrested for
narcotics offenses while on probation for narcotics convictions.
**Court administration advised the IAO that the disposition “sentence
indeterminate” is no longer used by the courts and that these entries were
incorrect. We were unable therefore to
identify the specific dispositions of
these cases.
These findings show that 12% of the nearly 1,800 cases reviewed were discharged/dismissed without adequate explanation and that the disposition of 17% of the cases reviewed were either inaccurate or unavailable. Since the Department does not monitor the status or disposition of cases, it is impossible to determine whether, or the extent to which, officer misconduct contributed to these dismissals.
Even narcotics cases which resulted in convictions were problematic. The IAO reviewed hundreds of cases where drug dealers were repeatedly arrested and released on bail – in some cases within weeks. In one of the cases a drug dealer had been arrested on felony narcotics charges thirteen times in six years (not including additional arrests for theft, assault, and burglary). In another case a defendant was out on bail after his sixth narcotics arrest when he was arrested for homicide.
In these cases the courts consolidated several narcotics cases against a defendant for one guilty plea and imposed identical concurrent sentences on each case. Court statistics reflect that numerous jail sentences were imposed when, in reality, only one jail term was imposed. In numerous cases reviewed, dealers served minimal jail time. This was evidenced by the fact that certain convicted drug dealers were arrested again for narcotics offenses within weeks of being sentenced to jail for prior narcotics convictions.
While this practice may be an expeditious means of reducing case backlogs and improving disposition statistics, this process would appear to do nothing to deter drug dealers from continuing their illegal activities.
Narcotics arrests disposition statistics are stark illustrations of the futility of a significant portion of the Department’s narcotics enforcement efforts and of the fact that the criminal justice system – from the police to probation/parole, is not prepared for, or equipped to handle, the onslaught of narcotics arrests flooding the system.
Legally effectuating arrests for narcotics offenses requires extensive resources. The most basic of narcotics operations – disruption of outdoor narcotics sales - may require as many as five to eight officers to devote an entire day developing the requisite probable cause to arrest the dealer (this does not include the pre-operation investigations including covert surveillance and use of confidential informants, and the time spent processing and prosecuting the arrests). In two years, more than 5,000 narcotics arrests, many of which involved the same, or greater, level of resources described here and which passed scrutiny by the District Attorneys Office, apparently did not even warrant a preliminary court hearing for reasons which are now unknown. From the perspective of the Police Department alone, this represents a significant waste of resources. Nor does it factor in the costs imposed on the prisons, courts, prosecutors and defenders office’s to shepherd these cases through the system.
The dysfunctional nature of the overall system has a pernicious effect on the morale of narcotics officers. Some of the officers and supervisors that the IAO interviewed viewed the “war on drugs”, and the criminal justice system, as fundamentally flawed, ineffectual, and unfair; and their efforts essentially meaningless. Some officers and supervisors expressed cynicism, resignation, disgust, and anger with the process. The integrity implications of these attitudes should not be underestimated. Over time such attitudes deplete the enthusiasm of officers who begin to regard the system as inherently “stacked against them,” particularly when their legitimate hard won narcotics arrests are dismissed on tenuous grounds, and notorious drug dealers are repeatedly released from jail despite their best efforts. As was clearly evidenced in the 39th District and other police scandals, officers eventually feel justified in cutting corners and developing their own set of rules on the street to compensate for and circumvent a system that officers perceive as unsupportive of legitimate police work.
Departmental
Studies and Audits of Narcotics Operations
Detailed, meaningful, and regular
audits of the Narcotics Bureau operations by trained, objective, and
independent personnel outside the Bureau are essential to insure that
narcotics enforcement activities are conducted within Departmental, legal, and
constitutional guidelines.
After extensive review of
the record keeping practices at the Narcotics Field Units and the Narcotics
Strike Force, the IAO has concluded that these units are methodical and
organized in the maintenance of records and reports such as search warrants,
property receipts, arrest reports, and so forth. When it became necessary to review the particulars of a specific
narcotics arrest, search warrant, confidential informant, disposition of
property, and so forth, the records tended to be easily accessible.
Additionally, the Narcotics
Bureau has an Integrity Control Office (“ICO”), staffed by a Lieutenant and a
police officer, that maintains data on confidential informants, search and
seizure warrants, and Vehicle and
Pedestrian Investigation Forms (75-48A’s).
The ICO also reviews daily summary sheets that document the activities
of narcotics officers.
The problem identified then,
is not whether the Department is collecting data regarding narcotics
enforcement operations, but rather the extent to which this information is
being consistently and effectively examined and analyzed to detect problems,
patterns, or trends, or to improve narcotics enforcement operations. Many of the Department’s studies/audits
simply offer raw statistics with virtually no analysis of their meaning, value,
or any underlying issues and problems that may exist.
This study has found that while the Department radically expanded
its narcotics enforcement operations, it failed to adequately expand its
internal auditing functions to monitor the integrity of these operations. With the exception of the limited studies and audits listed below,
the Department lacks an adequately staffed unit that is responsible for regularly
auditing corruption-prone operations such as the Narcotics Bureau. Furthermore, the IAO determined that the
Department failed to take appropriate steps to rectify problems identified in
some of these audits.
Integrity Control Office (“ICO”) – Narcotics Bureau
1. Since 1998, the ICO has submitted annual reports regarding Narcotics
Bureau search warrants. These reports track the number of warrants
obtained and executed, the number of warrants voided or expired, and the
evidence confiscated. However, these reports are simply raw statistics and do
not offer substantive analysis of the data such as the legitimacy of the
affidavits, the nature of the confiscations, or the justifications for the
voided or expired warrants.
For example, between 1997 and 2001 no evidence was
seized (so-called “negative warrants”) in three hundred and thirty-two of the
search warrants executed. While there
are numerous legitimate explanations for negative warrants, it is possible that
in some of these cases the subjects of the warrants had been alerted in advance
by the police, or that the warrants could have been based on stale, inaccurate,
or fabricated information. These and other possible explanations implicate
important integrity, supervisory accountability, and resource concerns that
should have been carefully evaluated.
Narcotics Bureau commanders allege that every negative warrant is
carefully reviewed by the pertinent supervisors, yet these investigations are
informal and undocumented, and thus not subject to independent review.
The data
describing evidence confiscations also lacks specificity regarding the quantity
and types of drugs and paraphernalia and the amount of money confiscated. This does not permit evaluation of the
quality or success of the narcotics investigations. Statistically, the majority of warrants indicate the confiscation
of narcotics, money, or weapons.
However, the IAO’s examination of the various reports prepared in
connection with narcotics arrests revealed that in a large percentage of the
cases, the evidence seized was minimal (i.e. a gram of cocaine, an ounce or two
of marijuana, a few dollars, or in many cases, the only evidence seized was a
document establishing residency - such as a utility bill). The IAO recognizes that despite the best
investigative efforts it is not possible for every narcotics investigation to
yield significant evidence. However,
considering the extensive time, effort, and resources spent obtaining the
warrants, and the dangers and intrusions inherent in their execution, it would
benefit the Narcotics Field Units to re-evaluate the efficacy of its
efforts.
2.
The ICO audited Vehicle and Pedestrian Investigation Forms (75-
48A’s) submitted by Narcotics Bureau personnel in
the year 2000 for completeness, as well as the legitimacy of the reasons listed
for the stop, frisk, or search. This
report indicated that during 2000, the Narcotics Field Units and the Narcotics
Intelligence and Investigation Unit submitted a total of twelve 75-48A’s. In
light of the significant level of activity of these units, this low number of
recorded stops seems highly improbable and should have prompted further inquiry
into the operations of these units.
In that same year, the
Narcotics Strike Force submitted seven thousand two hundred ninety-seven
75-48A’s. The audit found that 14% of
the forms had not been fully completed and contained omissions. The audit also found that 77% of the
reported stops and 57% of the reported frisks listed “boiler plate” language
such as “High Drug Area” or “Narcotics Activity” as the basis for these actions
- without any additional information justifying these intrusions. The
Department should be aware that these are not legally sufficient bases for detaining
citizens. Despite such a high incidence, the IAO could find no evidence that
the Department took any action to either understand the reason why this
occurred, or to rectify the situation.
During 1999,
the Integrity Control Unit (“ICU”) was established within the IAB to conduct
proactive integrity audits and investigations of issues and problems that
emerged in the course of conducting investigations into specific allegations of
misconduct.* The ICU was originally
staffed with one Staff Inspector, one corporal and eleven lieutenants. Since
2001, the ICU staffing level decreased to three lieutenants, which has
obviously diminished the effectiveness of this essential and important unit. The Integrity Control Unit has
conducted the following audits of Narcotics Bureau operations:
1. During 2001, the ICU audited property receipts and evidence handling
practices for the Narcotics
Strike Force and Field Units. These were the first external audits of evidence
handling practices in years, and we have not identified any subsequent
audits. Several problems were noted
that will be discussed at ___________________
*To a certain extent, the ICU assumed functions similar to the Management Review Bureau (MRB) which was established in mid-1980’s to conduct regular and proactive audits of Departmental operations to insure adherence to Departmental policies. Over time, the MRB became an internal “dumping ground” for supervisors and commanders who fell out of favor or committed some wrongdoing, and eventually lost its credibility and effectiveness. The MRB was essentially dissolved in 1997.
greater length in the “Evidence Control” section of this Report.
2. During 2001, ICU audited overtime accrual and search warrants
of one of the Narcotics Field Units. This audit provided information regarding the frequency with which overtime was accrued as a result of court attendance, investigations, or arrests. Yet the ICU conducted no investigation into, or analysis of, the legitimacy or justification of the overtime. The data revealed several cases where literally hundreds of overtime hours arose out of specific investigations that never led to arrests, yet there was no further analysis as to why this occurred.
The warrant review provided data regarding
the number of warrants executed that resulted in seizures, and the number of
warrants obtained that were expired or voided.
However, there was no further investigation into the legitimacy of the
affidavits, the nature of the confiscations, or the justifications for the
voided or expired warrants.
3. During
2001, the ICU audited Vehicle and
Pedestrian Investigation
Forms (75-48A’s) of the
Narcotics Strike Force from September 11, 2001 to September 17, 2001 to insure
that they were “free of material misstatements or errors”. Four 75-48A’s out of seventy-two were found
to have errors. One of the four forms
was missing. The remaining three, which
were completed by Strike Force supervisors, failed to state the basis for a
frisk or search.
4. During 2000, the ICU conducted an audit of
voided search warrants to
determine the reasons therefore and whether any patterns indicative of misconduct existed.
Per
Departmental policy, a warrant has been approved and signed by a judge
or Bail Commissioner becomes an Order of the Court
and thus, every attempt to execute the approved warrant should be
undertaken. Legitimate and compelling
reasons for non-execution should be properly documents and approved. The audit found that numerous narcotics
search warrants that had been reviewed by the District Attorney’s officer and
approved by the courts, were voided or not executed with no or inadequate
documented explanations.
The IAO’s subsequent review
of voided warrants revealed little improvement in the Bureau’s efforts to
document or investigate the reasons for warrants being voided.
5. During 2000, an ICU preliminary audit of active confidential
informant
(CI) files revealed numerous serious deficiencies that will be discussed at greater length in the “Confidential Informants” section of this Report.
Quality
Assurance Bureau
During 1997, after the
Department was determined to have employed deceptive practices in categorizing
and reporting crime statistics, the “Quality Assurance Bureau” was created to
audit departmentally generated crime statistics to ensure accuracy. The Quality Assurance Bureau has since undertaken additional audits
including monthly audits of Narcotics Bureau confidential informants’
expenditures, to insure reconciliation of the funds utilized for these
purposes.
Drug Testing
An important proactive integrity tool used by the
Department is drug screening urinalysis testing. Drug screening tests are mandatory for all officers prior to
transfer to the Narcotics Bureau and upon their return to duty from medical
leave. All other drug tests are ordered
by a random selection process which has resulted in many narcotics officers
never being selected to be tested, while other officers are repeatedly selected. As Table 13 indicates, it was not uncommon
to find some officers who were randomly selected for testing up to three times
in one year, while other officers were never tested despite being
assigned to the Bureau for years.
Drug testing records from 1996 through 2001 indicate that thirteen officers assigned to the Narcotics Bureau tested positive for drug use. Eleven of these officers tested positive for prescription medication and were eventually cleared by the Medical Review Officer. Two officers tested positive for marijuana and were separated from the Department.
|
Year |
# Random Tests Performed |
# of sworn employees in Narcotics Bureau |
% of Narcotics Bureau Officers Tested |
|
1996 |
76 |
250 |
30% |
|
1997 |
104 |
251 |
41% |
|
1998 |
168 |
415 |
40% |
|
1999 |
162 |
451 |
35% |
|
2000 |
169 |
577 |
29% |
|
2001 |
199 |
601 |
33% |
1. The Department should establish regular and meaningful
proactive audits of Narcotics Bureau operations by an independent, objective,
and adequately resourced entity outside the Bureau. There should be meaningful and timely follow
up of the findings of any of the audits, documentation of efforts to effectuate
necessary changes, and strict accountability for insuring that the weaknesses
and problems are rectified.
2. Implement a policy mandating unannounced yearly drug screening
tests for all narcotics officers and require the use of hair drug
screening testing, as opposed to urinalysis testing, which is considerably more
effective in detecting drug use over a longer period of time
Summary Analysis of Information Sources
Based on the review of the preceding information sources, there appears to be no evidence of systemic or widespread corruption in the Narcotics Bureau. Serious incidents of corruption and misconduct that were documented tended to be isolated and individualistic. Objective indicators such as use of force notifications (even assuming a degree of underreporting), lawsuits, and citizen complaints against police, filed as a result of Narcotics Bureau activities, were relatively low when compared to the dramatic increase in narcotics arrests over the same time period. Thus it appears that the Department’s narcotics enforcement operations are largely conducted within the boundaries established by law and Departmental policies – as it relates to serious corruption and excessive force.
Despite this generally positive assessment, the IAO has identified important weaknesses in the Narcotics Bureau personnel screening, training, transfer policies, supervisory oversight, personnel evaluation, discipline, and internal monitoring practices that have created conditions conducive to breeding corruption and decreasing the likelihood of detection should misconduct or corruption occur.
This observation does not imply that misconduct is widespread in the Narcotics Bureau. Most of the officers and supervisors in the Bureau appear to be ethical and committed professionals who work under dangerous, frustrating, and physically challenging conditions. Yet, as the 39th District and other scandals have demonstrated, a few corrupt officers can taint the entire Department’s reputation, call into question the validity of every narcotics arrest, erode public confidence in the integrity of its force, diminish the Department’s ability to combat crime, and cost the city’s taxpayers millions of dollars in litigation settlements.
Nor does the IAO’s observation suggest that the Department has been altogether lax in implementing necessary reforms and safeguards. Since the 39th District scandal the Department has implemented a number of reforms designed to prevent and detect corruption, particularly in the area on narcotics enforcement.
Finally, the IAO recognizes that the underlying causes of some of the problems, including budgetary, labor, Civil Service, and Home Rule Charter constraints and restrictions, impede the Department’s ability to establish effective safeguards against corruption. However, not all the problems identified can be attributed to factors beyond the Department’s control. It is apparent that increased narcotics enforcement efforts were undertaken without appropriate and effective controls, oversight, and monitoring mechanisms to curb and detect potential abuses.
These issues will be the focus of the remainder of this Report.
NARCOTICS BUREAU
PERSONNEL AND MANAGEMENT POLICIES,
PRACTICES AND
PROCEDURES
Personnel Selection Process
In light of the numerous opportunities for corruption, it is imperative that officers assigned to the Narcotics Bureau have a proven track record of integrity. The Department’s Organized Crime and Intelligence Unit (OCIU) is currently responsible for conducting the investigations into officers applying for transfer to the Narcotics Bureau. According to OCIU personnel (there are no formal Department directives outlining Narcotics Bureau transfer screening guidelines) the transfer background checks consist of the following:
· Officers must complete a transfer questionnaire form. The IAO review of Narcotics Bureau personnel transfer files indicates no attempts to confirm the accuracy of the applicant’s answers to many essentially meaningless questions.
· The officers disciplinary, IAB, and sick leave databases are checked. There is no indication that the actual IAB investigation files or disciplinary records are reviewed.
·
Computer
inquiries with the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) are made to
determine whether the officer has a criminal record.
·
The
officer’s driver’s license is checked to insure that it is valid.
As the IAO has documented in
a prior study (See: IAO Second Monitoring Report, September 1998), the initial
background investigation process for being hired by the Department entails
minimal independent investigation into an applicant’s character and integrity.
A criminal record check is done, however prior employment history and character
assessment interviews are virtually meaningless, educational records are not reviewed,
and the results of the financial background checks are ignored. In 2002, the Department omitted the
polygraph as a means of determining an applicant’s involvement with illegal
narcotics as part of its routine recruit screening process.
As the IAO has further
documented in prior reports (See: IAO Second Monitoring Report, September 1998
and IAO Report on the Disciplinary System, March 2000) the Department’s
personnel evaluations are virtually useless tools for assessing on officer’s
work record and suitability for assignment to a sensitive unit such as
narcotics. (Personnel evaluations are regarded as so non-essential by the
Department that none were completed for three years in the past decade). Thus, the information gathered by the OCIU
regarding an officer’s employment history, work record, economic status, or
degree of integrity is relatively shallow and uninformative.
Applicants deemed
appropriate based on the OCIU initial cursory check are then interviewed by two
Narcotics Strike Force lieutenants.
(Department policy requires that officers transferred to the Narcotics
Bureau must first rotate through the Narcotics Strike Force before assignment
to the Narcotics Field Units.)
As part of this study, the IAO directly observed several transfer
interviews. Each interview lasted an
average of ten minutes and the interviewers did not have copies of the
applicant’s IAB investigations or disciplinary records. Instead, they relied on the explanations of
the officers regarding the nature of these investigations.
If the applicant is deemed
acceptable by the Narcotics Strike Force interviewers, the transfer request is
forwarded through the chain of command for review and a final determination is
made by the Police Commissioner.
(Records reviewed by the IAO indicate that in the past several years,
only twenty-one officers and two supervisors, out of several hundred, were
disapproved for transfer to the Bureau.) Once approved, the officer must
undergo a scheduled drug screening urinalysis test. This minimal screening process has been circumvented altogether
when a transfer is directly ordered at the request of the Police Commissioner.*
In light of the sensitivity of a Narcotics Bureau assignment,
this background check is simply not adequate.
After conducting a survey of
other law enforcement agencies** we recommend that the additional following
qualifications and steps be included in the transfer investigation and
screening process:
1. Narcotics officers, particularly those working in an undercover
capacity,
operate relatively independently for sustained time
periods, under conditions that can be far more dangerous than uniformed patrol
functions. Law enforcement agencies
around the country that we surveyed therefore require a minimum of three to
four years patrol experience before assignment into a sensitive, specialized
unit such as narcotics.
______________________
*This practice, which is referred as
“parachuting” in the Department, negatively impacts on officer morale who
regard assignments to desirable units as dependent on “who you know” as opposed
to legitimate and hard earned qualifications.
Additionally, circumventing a thorough screening process increases the
risk of unqualified officers being assigned into sensitive, corruption prone units
such as narcotics.
**Applicants to the Federal Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA), with no prior law enforcement experience, must undergo a nearly nine-month
background investigation. Per DEA
standards, applicants must be at least twenty-three years old, have a college
degree, and be fluent in another language. An intensive field investigation is
conducted which includes review of the applicant’s educational and employment
records and history. Complete medical,
psychiatric, criminal, protection from abuse orders, and financial checks are
conducted and the applicant must undergo a polygraph to determine past
involvement with narcotics.
Our review of the Narcotics
Bureau revealed that nearly 17% of the officers assigned to the Bureau had
significantly less patrol experience than is deemed prudent by law enforcement
agencies nationwide (twenty-one officers had less than one year on the force,
thirty-two officers had less than two years on the force, and forty-eight
officers had less than three years on the force).
It is imperative that the
Department establish and adhere to a policy requiring a minimum of three full
years patrol experience as a prerequisite for transfer into the Narcotics
Bureau.
2. Implement a policy requiring full financial disclosure statements
as condition of assignment to the Narcotics Bureau. It is essential that an
initial financial baseline be established in order to identify questionable or
problematic changes in an officer’s means, lifestyle, and income. Detailed and
meaningful financial disclosures that are carefully reviewed should then be
required on an annual basis. Any
necessary follow-up investigations should be handled by IAB.
3. Review any lawsuits in
which the officer was a named defendant, protection from abuse orders,
delinquent support orders, and vehicle/scofflaw records, as part of the
background investigation process.
4. Require that the actual IAB investigations and disciplinary
records be
reviewed where applicable, particularly if the
allegations seem serious, or a questionable behavioral pattern is evident.
5. Require transfer applicants to submit to polygraphs to detect
possible
involvement with illegal drugs or other criminal
activities.
6. Establish and enforce a formal written policy regarding the retention of
Narcotics Bureau transfer/background investigation files, to be incorporated in the officer’s personnel files for as long as the officer remains on the force. Until two years ago, these records were discarded by the Department. For this reason, the IAO was unable to review the transfer records of any officer who was assigned to the Bureau prior to that time to determine whether legitimate background investigations had ever been conducted.
7. Conduct full background investigations on all civilian personnel
assigned to narcotics related functions in the Department due to their proximity and access to sensitive information, investigations, and evidence. A recent occurrence in which a civilian employee assigned to the Police Chemistry Lab was arrested during the execution of a search warrant in which significant amounts of narcotics and cash were seized illustrates the need for such a policy.
8. Improve the Department’s personnel evaluations so that they are
meaningful and useful performance and integrity assessment tools.
Narcotics
Enforcement Training
Continually evolving laws
and law enforcement strategies and techniques required to combat increasingly
sophisticated trafficking operations point to the need for ongoing and relevant
training to insure the professionalism and effectiveness of narcotics
enforcement efforts.
The IAO was able to identify the following training programs offered to Narcotics Bureau officers.
· A two-week training course was apparently provided several years ago to large group of officers who were simultaneously transferred into Narcotics Bureau. However, the IAO was unable to locate and review the pertinent course curriculum.
· Some Narcotics Bureau officers who are transferred in isolated circumstances may not undergo formal training with the exception of a required two-day course to be certified in the testing and processing of narcotics.
· A four/five day narcotics enforcement course that is mandated for officer’s who are assigned to the district Narcotic Enforcement Teams (“NET’s”) has been randomly offered to Narcotics Bureau officers. Two NET’s training courses were apparently offered in the past year, however, the IAO was unable to locate or review records related to this training.
The Department justifies
such sporadic and limited narcotics training by referring to an unwritten
policy which states that the Narcotics Bureau will cull potential officers to
the Bureau from the district NET’s - the assumption being that these officers
will have had NET’s training and narcotics enforcement experience. However,
this policy does not always translate into practice as it is not uncommon for
officers and supervisors to be transferred directly into the Narcotics Bureau
with no prior district NET’s, or other narcotics enforcement experience.*
The IAO is sensitive to the
fact that proper training requires considerable resources which are difficult
to obtain in light of the budgetary constraints facing the Department. However adequate and consistent training
will improve the morale, professionalism, and effectiveness of the Narcotics
Bureau.
______________
*Newly hired agents of the Federal Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) must
undergo an eighteen week training program and receive consistent in-service
training. DEA supervisors receive an
additional fourteen to fifteen weeks training.
Newly appointed narcotics investigators to the State’s Bureau of
Narcotics Investigations (BNI) undergo a six to seven week training course.
Transfer
Policies and Practices
Law enforcement agencies
around the country require regular rotations and transfers of narcotics
officers every three to four years. (In accordance with DEA policy, a narcotics
agent can stay in an undercover assignment for a maximum of three years. “Deep” undercover assignments last no more
than thirteen months.) This practice is
regarded as an important and necessary integrity control tool to prevent
narcotics officers from identifying too closely with the individuals they are
investigating; becoming too insular, self-protective and burnt-out; and from
becoming dependent on additional “overtime” income that is neither predictable
nor guaranteed.
Regular transfers and
rotations of narcotics officers do not occur in the Narcotics Bureau. Table 14 shows that one hundred and
thirty-two (22%) of the officers have been assigned to the Narcotics Bureau
well over the time period deemed prudent.
Many of these officers have worked closely together for many years. Experts with whom we spoke regarded this
situation as a potentially serious integrity threat.
Table 14
Number of
Officers in Narcotics Bureau for Five or More Years
# Years assigned to Narcotics # officers
16 2
15 2
14 16
13 9
12 23
11 6
10 7
9 6
8 16
7 9
6 9
5 27
Some commanders interviewed
by the IAO expressed concern about the difficulties in transferring problem
officers once integrity issues surface.
The following examples reflect and validate their concerns:
· An off-duty narcotics officer was involved in an incident in which the officer and several others, armed with handguns, harassed and threatened a civilian who had reported illegal activities. The IAB investigation sustained allegations of verbal abuse, failing to cooperate and making false statements during the IAB investigation, and fraternizing with known criminals. In the ensuing disciplinary action, the officer’s commander requested that the officer be transferred to a less sensitive assignment. The officer received a five-day suspension but remains in the Narcotics Bureau.
· An IAB investigation of two narcotics officers sustained allegations of verbal abuse, and failing to cooperate and making false statements during the IAB investigation. In the ensuing disciplinary actions, the commanding officer recommended that both officers receive a ten day suspension and a transfer to a less sensitive assignment within the Department because “As a member of the Narcotics Bureau, honesty and integrity are an absolute priority, and the fact that [these officers] were not truthful during this incident jeopardizes their abilities to be productive members of the Narcotics Bureau.” These officers each forfeited four vacation days and are still assigned to the Narcotics Bureau.
· An IAB investigation discovered that a narcotics officer had made false statements on her Police Data Questionnaire (the Department’s initial employment application), and was not truthful about the nature and extent of her involvement with a family member who was a known drug dealer. The investigation sustained allegations of fraternizing with known criminals, knowingly making false entries in departmental reports and records, and failing to cooperate and making false statements during an administrative investigation. In light of the IAB findings, the officer’s Commanding officer recommended that “Based on the above facts, it does not appear to be in the best interest of the Department for the [officer] to remain assigned to the Narcotics Bureau”. This officer was never formally disciplined and is still assigned to the Narcotics Bureau.
· A narcotics officer was disciplined for failing to appear in court on numerous occasions which resulted in the discharge of several narcotics cases. The supervisor’s disciplinary evaluation of the officer revealed that the officer has a “bad attitude” and has “displayed little or no regard for his position as a police officer. It is requested that [this officer] be transferred out of [Narcotics Field Unit]”. This officer is still assigned to the Narcotics Bureau.
· A narcotics officer was involved in an on-duty auto accident, left the scene, never informed a supervisor about the incident, provided false information when questioned about the accident, and falsified police records prepared in connection with the accident. This officer was never formally disciplined. This same officer had an IAB and disciplinary history that included another unreported auto accident in which the officer left the scene (this accident occurred off-duty), and an incident in which the officer grossly mishandled narcotics evidence. Only one of these cases resulted in formal disciplinary action (a one day suspension), and this officer was only recently transferred out of the Narcotics Bureau despite earlier efforts by the officer’s commanding officer to have the officer reassigned.
· During the execution of a search warrant at the home of a reputed drug dealer, narcotics officers discovered incriminating evidence against another officer in the Department and never notified a supervisor as required by Departmental policy. One of the narcotics officers who had been part of the raid tipped off the discovery of the evidence to the officer incriminated by the evidence. Several of the involved officers had been assigned to the Narcotics Bureau for over a decade (one officer had been in the Bureau for fifteen years).
An ensuing IAB investigation into this incident revealed serious and ongoing personnel problems between the supervisor and the officers in his squad. In one of numerous memos by this supervisor documenting the escalating personnel problems, the supervisor stated “This squad is burned out and also does not want to conform to the new way of addressing crime”. These officers were never disciplined and are still assigned to the Narcotics Bureau.
Recommendations
It is critical that term
limits in the Narcotics Bureau be initiated and enforced on a regular basis.
The Department should advise all transfer applicants of the rotation policy
prior to being transferred into the unit.
Critics of this recommendation point to the resultant loss of
experienced officer’s. However, in
light of the fact that officers and supervisors generally receive minimal formal
training, this argument seems spurious at best. Furthermore, the reputation of the Department, which would be
seriously harmed in the advent of another scandal, is far more important than
any loss of experience that may result.
Finally implementing a regular rotation policy in the Narcotics Bureau
creates a far more equitable situation in the Department whereby other
qualified officers are given the opportunity to enrich and diversify their law
enforcement careers. This would improve
the morale and enthusiasm of the force overall.
Supervisory Oversight and Accountability
Police scandals in Philadelphia and throughout the nation have identified weak supervisory oversight as a key ingredient in corruption scandals. In the 39th District scandal and others, corrupt officers co-opted, ignored, circumvented, or lied to their supervisors and commanders – some of whom did not have adequate experience, training, integrity, interest, or common-sense to detect or prohibit the improper activities of their subordinates.
Effective supervisory oversight is therefore a critical component in maintaining the integrity of narcotics enforcement operations. Supervisors and commanders are expected to enforce all Departmental policies, and to monitor and evaluate the integrity and quality of their subordinate’s activities. Supervisors selected for the Narcotics Bureau must therefore be appropriately experienced and trained, carefully screened, evaluated, monitored, afforded appropriate resources, and supported by the Department’s leadership. For the reasons described below, these are not consistent practices in the Narcotics Bureau.
2. An officer can become a front line supervisor in narcotics with as little as three years on the force and little or no narcotics enforcement experience or training. Narcotics supervisors training may only consist of the four-day NET training course offered to district narcotic officers. (In the DEA, agents promoted into a supervisory capacity receive an additional fourteen to fifteen weeks of training.) This has created the unbalanced situation where inexperienced corporals, sergeants, or lieutenants may be supervising narcotics officers with vastly more narcotics experience.
3. The Department has no formal or consistent policy regarding the rotation of narcotics supervisors. Law enforcement agencies around the country require regular supervisory rotations to prevent supervisors from becoming too close to their subordinates, adversely affecting their ability to remain neutral or objective in their interactions with subordinates. (DEA supervisors are rotated every year.) In one narcotics supervisor evaluation we reviewed, a Sergeant’s only positive attribute noted was that the Sergeant was “well liked, having endeared himself to his subordinates”.
4. According
to records provided to the IAO by the Narcotics Bureau, officer/supervisor
ratios in the Narcotics Field Units consist of one corporal and one sergeant
for every seven to eleven undercover officers.
In the Narcotics Strike Force, the officer/supervisor ratios consist of
one lieutenant, two sergeants and one corporal for every twenty-three to
twenty-four narcotics officers. (The DEA supervisor/agent ratio consists of one
lieutenant and three sergeants for every twelve agents).
However, these supervisor/officer ratios are not a
consistent reality. Narcotics
supervisors are frequently on vacation, in training, out sick or
injured-on-duty, attending funerals, and so forth. In some cases, supervisors are out on extended military leave,
are detailed out of the Bureau for various reasons, or they retire, resign, or
are dismissed. In these cases,
replacements may not always be secured in a timely manner, leaving gaps in the
supervisory slots.
This can and has led to situations where narcotics
officers are ineffectively supervised.
In one IAB investigation, a narcotics squad was conducting a
surveillance and vehicle and pedestrian stops at a drug trafficking location. A
citizen who was detained during this operation filed a complaint alleging
harassment. In the ensuing
investigation, IAB found that the involved officers neither informed police
radio of the investigations nor submitted pedestrian and vehicle investigation
forms as required by Departmental policy. One explanation for these oversights
was that only one corporal was overseeing the entire squad that day.
Since supervisor’s names do not appear on the arrest
reports and they are not required to maintain activity/patrol logs, it is
virtually impossible to monitor the degree of supervisory interaction with
their squads and platoons. Furthermore,
in light of the vast increase in narcotics enforcement operations that have
occurred without a corresponding increase in supervisory personnel and
resources, one has to question the degree of consistent and meaningful
supervisory oversight that is actually occurring. Thus, while inadequate and ineffective levels of supervision
exist, the extent of the problem is difficult to assess.
5. Since supervisors set the tone, impart the values of the organization, and serve as role models and authority figures, they must be held to the highest standards. However, the IAO found that supervisors are not always held accountable for misconduct in which they participated, or did not properly detect despite obvious signs and signals. As the following examples illustrate, disciplinary actions against supervisors who failed to properly supervise or violated Departmental policies are inconsistent and lax.*
__________________
*When supervisors in the same chain of command face disciplinary actions
arising from the same incident, they are required to submit disciplinary
evaluations of each other. Needless to
say, we have never reviewed a critical evaluation in these circumstances,
despite highly questionable conduct.
·
A narcotics supervisor intentionally used improper
overtime codes to obtain overtime. This
supervisor was neither disciplined for this incident nor transferred out of the Bureau.
· IAB conducted an investigation into the theft of jewelry which occurred during a major narcotics arrest in which hundreds of pounds of marijuana and firearms were confiscated. According to the IAB investigative summary, the supervising Lieutenant was unable to reconstruct the manner in which evidence was seized and disposed because “he relies on his personnel to do what they should do. He said that he did not give them any direction as to what should be done with the confiscated items, nor did he check to ensure that everything was properly marked and secured” The Lieutenant was asked to conduct interviews with officers who participated in the operation. When the IAB requested copies of these interviews, the Lieutenant was unable to locate all of them. This supervisor is still assigned to narcotics.
·
A narcotics supervisor failed to properly review a
deficient search warrant which resulted in the execution of a warrant at an
improper location. In another incident,
this same supervisor was notified of, yet made no effort to ascertain how
narcotics evidence that had been seized during the execution of a search
warrant was ultimately reported missing.
The supervisor was disciplined for the latter incident only (a
reprimand) and is still assigned to narcotics.
·
During the course of an IAB investigation it was
revealed that a narcotics officer had been
regularly driving to and from work in cars that were uninsured,
unregistered, and displaying counterfeit inspection stickers. This narcotics officer had twelve address
changes and numerous phone number changes in a relatively short time
period. At some point, this officer was
living in his car. The officer was
eventually fired for impersonating an IAB investigator and failing to cooperate
and lying during the IAB investigation.
This officer’s
supervisors were never questioned nor held accountable for their failure to
recognize and intervene in what could have been a serious security and integrity
risk, or to report the officer for driving illegal cars. (Curiously, in this
case, the District Attorney’s Office declined to prosecute this officer despite
the fact that the IAB proved that the officer knowingly displayed counterfeit
inspection and emission stickers on his cars in violation of sections of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code
pertaining to Forgery, Tampering with Public Records or Information, and Motor
Vehicle Insurance Fraud. Despite this
declination, the D.A.’s Office advised the Department that they would no longer
call this officer to testify in any criminal cases.)
· An IAB investigation found that a narcotics supervisor deliberately ignored numerous Departmental policies and safeguards regarding the use of confidential informants, which resulted in the arrest of an elderly, sick, and innocent woman. The investigation also revealed that the supervisor ordered several constitutionally impermissible searches during the execution of a warrant obtained based solely on the informant’s fabricated information. This supervisor forfeited five vacation days as a result of this incident and is still assigned to the Narcotics Bureau.
In an unrelated incident, this same supervisor failed to document an arrangement wherein he permitted a subordinate officer to leave work early on numerous occasions (this was discovered during an IAB surveillance of the narcotics officer on unrelated allegations). In this case the officer, and not the supervisor, was reprimanded.
· A narcotics supervisor was involved in a narcotics arrest in which he assaulted the suspect with his portable radio, yet failed to notify the IAB regarding the force incident as required per Departmental policy. While the use of force was found to be within Departmental guidelines, the supervisor was never disciplined for failing to properly report the force incident. This supervisor was eventually arrested and fired for domestic violence.
· A narcotics supervisor had three IAB investigations in which Departmental violations against him were sustained. None of these cases resulted in formal discipline. The same supervisor has a total of ten IAB investigations into excessive force (3-not sustained, 4-exonerated, 1-unfounded, 2 shootings – no violations found) and nine additional use of force entries in use of force database. This supervisor is still assigned to the Narcotics Bureau.
· An IAB investigation sustained allegations against a narcotics supervisor for abuse of authority, yet this supervisor was never disciplined. This supervisor’s IAB history consists of one sustained allegation of “misconduct” which did not result in discipline, a sustained allegation of improper use of a firearms and giving false statements during an official investigation which resulted in a lengthy suspension, six allegations of physical abuse (all not sustained), one allegation of theft (not sustained), and three shootings (no violations). This supervisor is still assigned to the Narcotics Bureau.
· A narcotics supervisor violated several Departmental policies by meeting and compensating a civilian who was providing information on narcotics sales. The alleged “confidential informant” was never registered or approved by the Department, nor were any of the contacts and payments documented or approved. This supervisor was never formally disciplined and remains in the Bureau.
·
During the execution of a search warrant at the home of
a reputed drug dealer, narcotics officers discovered incriminating evidence
against another officer in the Department who was not assigned to the Narcotics
Bureau. This evidence was never reported to the IAB by the narcotics
supervisor. During the IAB
investigation, the supervisor in charge of this squad gave contradictory and
evasive statements regarding the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the
incriminating evidence. The IAB
investigation further revealed that the supervisor discussed with his squad the
details of his interview with the IAB investigator in violation of Departmental
policy. This supervisor is still in the
Narcotics Bureau.
Most of the narcotics supervisors and commanders
that were interviewed by the IAO as part of this study were ethical and
dedicated professionals. Furthermore,
the IAO reviewed several important investigations in which narcotics
supervisors and commanders took it upon themselves to report integrity problems
to the IAB – problems that most likely would have remained undetected were it
not for the commander’s voluntary disclosure.
For example, in one case, when cash seized during the execution of a
warrant was subsequently reported missing, a commander referred the matter to
IAB. In another case, a commander
informed IAB of a narcotics officer whom he had reason to suspect was leaking
sensitive information to drug dealers.
This matter was investigated and the officer was arrested and fired.
However, weaknesses in the supervisor selection
process and transfer practices, inadequate supervisory resources, training,
monitoring, evaluating, and inconsistencies and deficiencies in supervisory accountability
described above, raise troublesome questions regarding the overall
effectiveness of supervisory oversight in the Narcotics Bureau.
To evaluate disciplinary
practices in the Bureau, the IAO reviewed records maintained by the Departments
Police Board Of Inquiry (PBI)* from 1997-2001 to
1997 – Twenty-four disciplinary actions
identified
·
Two
allegations of verbal abuse each resulting in a three-day suspension.
·
One
auto accident resulting in a two-day suspension.
·
Nineteen
allegations of officers failing to appear in court each resulting in a
Reprimand.
·
Two
allegations of “Failure to fully cooperate in a Departmental
Investigation” each
resulting in a finding of “not guilty”.
·
Four
auto accidents each resulting in a reprimand.
·
Officer
tested positive for illegal drugs - officer resigned
·
One
allegation of “Failure to comply with Commissioner’s Orders,
Regulations etc.” resulting in a reprimand.
_______________
*The PBI is the unit in the Department responsible for processing
formal disciplinary actions, conducting internal administrative hearings at
which disciplinary charges against officers are presented, and maintaining
disciplinary records and data.
** The IAO released a report in
March 2001 which presented a detailed examination of the Department’s
disciplinary system. Some of the
problems and deficiencies identified in that study were still evident in this
audit.
1999 – Four disciplinary
actions identified
·
Two allegations of “Failure to cooperate fully in a
Departmental
investigation” each resulting in a four-day
suspension. (The Department’s
Disciplinary Code penalty guidelines mandate a ten-day
suspension to
dismissal for this offense.)
·
One
allegation of “Damage or loss to Police property” resulting in a
reprimand.
·
One
allegation of “Absence without leave” resulting in a reprimand.
·
One
allegation of “Failure to fully cooperate in a Departmental
investigation” resulting in a dismissal.
·
One
allegation of insubordination resulting in a fifteen day suspension and
transfer.
·
One
allegation of “Loss or damage to police property” resulting in a
reprimand.
·
One
allegation of “Failure to comply with any Commissioner’s orders,
regulations etc.” resulting in a five day suspension.
·
One
allegation of associating and/or
fraternizing with known criminals
resulting in a verdict of “not guilty”
·
Two
allegations of “Failure to properly
collect and preserve evidence” each
resulting in a reprimand.
2001 - Four disciplinary
actions identified
·
One allegation of failing to appear in court
resulting in a eight day
suspension.
·
One
allegation of “Failure to take police action” resulting in a eight day
suspension and transfer.
· One allegation of “Loss or damage to police property” resulting in a
reprimand.
· One allegation of “Failure to comply with any Commissioner’s Orders,
regulations, etc.” resulting in a one-day suspension.
The above statistics reflect
that 68% of the forty-four disciplinary actions instituted against narcotics
officers over the past five years resulted in reprimands. Additionally, since 1999, the IAB has
sustained over twenty-nine allegations of misconduct against narcotics
officers. However, only fifteen formal disciplinary actions have been brought
against narcotics officers since 1999, several of which are unrelated to the
IAB investigations. The following are additional
examples of inconsistent and poor disciplinary practices:
·
Since
1997, there has only been ONE disciplinary action against a narcotics officer
or supervisor for failure to appear in court, despite records which indicated
that in more than 7,000 instances narcotics officers failed to appear in court
without legitimate or documented explanations.
·
There
was not a single disciplinary action against narcotics officers or supervisors
for failing to complete necessary reports such as 75-48A’s, use of force
notifications etc., despite several IAB investigations noting these
violations.
·
An
IAB investigation sustained allegations of verbal and physical abuse against a
narcotics officer who was never disciplined for these offenses.
In this same investigation,
the IAB cited a second narcotics officer with several Departmental violations
that resulted in a reprimand. This
officer’s IAB history includes nine excessive force investigations (one was
sustained yet no disciplinary action was initiated, four were not-sustained;
one is still open; two were shootings where no violations were found, two were
exonerated), and one verbal abuse allegation that was sustained and resulted in
a reprimand.
·
Several
narcotics officers who deliberately concealed incriminating evidence against
another Philadelphia police officer that was found during the execution of a
search warrant at the residence of a known drug dealer were never formally
disciplined and are still assigned to the Narcotics Bureau.
·
An
off-duty narcotics officer accidentally discharged a gun in a bar causing
injuries to an innocent bystander. The
officer never reported, and attempted to conceal, the shooting. The officer’s commander recommended that the
officer receive a five-day suspension and not be transferred out of the
Narcotics Bureau. This officer received
a twenty-day suspension and was ultimately transferred out of the Narcotics
Bureau.
·
A
narcotics officer lost narcotics evidence that had been confiscated during
a raid and the ensuing felony charges were
discharged. The officer was
reprimanded. The same officer had a
prior firearms discharge violation that did not result in formal discipline.
·
A
narcotics officer failed to do a proper investigation before obtaining a search
warrant, resulting in the execution of the warrant at the residence of an
innocent family. The officer forfeited
two vacation days. This disciplinary
action is not listed in the discipline database. This officer’s direct supervisor was charged with “Failure to
properly supervise” which resulted in a reprimand. This disciplinary action is also not listed in the discipline
database.
·
A
narcotics officer who repeatedly left work early and failed to truthfully
document this conduct was charged with four counts of “Unauthorized absence
from assignment” and received a one-day suspension. The Disciplinary Code penalty guidelines mandate progressive
discipline under these circumstances which did not occur.
·
A
narcotics officer had disciplinary charges of “Failure to comply with
Commissioner’s Orders etc.” and “Insubordination” filed against him in December
1996. To date no action has been taken
on this matter and the officer is still assigned to the Narcotics Bureau. This same officer has a prior disciplinary
record that includes “Fighting with members of the Department while one or both
are on duty” that resulted in ten-day suspension.
·
An
officer accumulated the following IAB history since being assigned to the
Narcotics Bureau in 1996: two sustained
allegations of physical abuse that did not result in disciplinary actions, a
sustained allegation of violating an emergency Protection From Abuse Order that
did not result in any disciplinary action, three open investigations for
missing money, physical abuse, and domestic violence. This officer was not disciplined and remained in the Narcotics
Bureau until the spring of 2002 when he was dismissed.
·
A
narcotics officer was the subject of two IAB investigations involving
allegations of illegal detentions and searches. In both cases, the officer indicated on the
Vehicle and Pedestrian Investigation Forms (75-48A) that searches had not been
conducted, yet the IAB investigation proved that in both cases, both the
occupants and the vehicles were searched.
This officer was never disciplined, nor was there any evidence that the
officer received counseling or training.
·
A
narcotics officer with a sustained allegation of “excessive force” was never
disciplined.
Evidence Control
Departmental Directive 91 sets forth detailed guidelines and procedures regarding the handling of evidence seized in criminal investigations. The integrity of evidence handling in narcotics enforcement operations must receive the highest priority and the slightest deviations from these guidelines should raise suspicions and be immediately and thoroughly investigated. The following examples reveal that the Narcotics Bureau does not strictly enforce or monitor compliance with the applicable Department regulations.
1. The IAB audit of the Narcotics Bureau property receipts described earlier in
this Report revealed that narcotics officers were inconsistent in turning in evidence within the Departmental guidelines. This practice was particularly disturbing as it related to confiscated cash. The audits identified numerous instances where narcotics officers retained possession of confiscated cash ranging from several hundred to several thousand dollars for a number of weeks before turning it in to the evidence custodian. In two instances cash totaling $1,254 was never submitted to the Evidence Custodian, and in one instance a vehicle that had been confiscated had never been submitted to the appropriate storage agency.
Raid Operations Policies” explicitly describes the
procedural guidelines that must be followed during the execution of warrants to
insure the integrity of seized evidence and to protect the Department from
unwarranted allegations of theft. Per
this memo, during the execution of a warrant:
“A search
team will be comprised of a
supervisor, recording officer, inventory officer and any additional officers
needed.
The owner of the property or person in charge of the property will be present in each room when it is searched.
Only one room at a time will be searched.
When a member of the search team locates evidence,
the supervisor will be notified and the evidence will be left in place. The inventory officer will then take the
evidence into custody.
When money, jewelry, or other valuables are taken
into custody, they will be accounted for in the presence of the person in
control of the property. When large
amounts of money are taken into custody and it is highly impractical to count
it on the scene, the money will be bagged and kept in the presence of the
defendant during transportation to the Narcotics Unit. The money will be in possession of the
inventory officer and a supervisor.
All money, jewelry and other valuables will be
bagged and heat-sealed closed for transportation into the Narcotics Unit.
Any person who denies that money or certain personal
property belongs to him/her will be requested to write out a statement to that
effect right on the property receipt.
When search warrants result in negative searched, a
memorandum will be prepared to the Commanding Officer, Narcotics Unit outlining
the facts of the case.
Upon return to the Narcotics Unit, the supervisor,
assigned investigator, and the inventory officer will weigh all controlled
substances that were confiscated.
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THIS POLICY WILL RESULT IN
DISCIPLINARY ACTION OF THE PERSONNEL INVOLVED.
Several important IAB
investigations revealed a lack of adherence to
virtually all of the procedural safeguards described
above.
No formal search teams
existed and officers generally fanned out throughout the premises and conducted
simultaneous searches of several rooms – sometimes individually. Supervisors were not summoned to locations
where evidence was found, occupants were not present in the rooms being
searched, several officers handled and processed seized evidence, some evidence
was not heat sealed on location, and no suspect was ever required to review or
sign a property receipt. In
fact, of the nearly 1,200 property receipts reviewed by the IAO as part of this
audit, not a single property receipt was signed. Approximately five dozen of the property receipts indicated that
the Defendant was “unavailable” or that the property owner “refused to sign”
the property receipt.
In discussing these findings
with narcotics personnel, the prevailing attitude
was that the procedural guidelines described above
are unrealistically burdensome.
The Department should
consider using video cameras to record the
execution of warrants, and developing video review
and storage policies and procedures.
This would serve as an excellent deterrent of improper conduct and at
the same time protect the Department from unwarranted allegations of theft and
other civil rights violations.
the execution of a search warrant were subsequently reported “missing”. The investigation revealed haphazard and
sloppy practices in both the search and evidence handling that precluded IAB
from assessing what happened to the money.
The narcotics supervisor
responsible for overseeing this operation was cited by the IAB for failing to
properly supervise the officers involved in the execution of the warrant. This same supervisor was also the subject of
a prior IAB investigation initiated by a citizen who alleged that narcotics
officers illegally entered and searched his home and stole several hundred
dollars. The allegations were
ultimately not sustained, however, the IAB investigation concluded that the
supervisor failed to follow proper procedures in raid operations by allowing
the officers to search each room individually without supervision. This supervisor remains in the Narcotics
Bureau.
narcotics officer while the officer was
off-duty. When questioned about this
discovery, the officer claimed that numerous packs of cocaine had been seized
during the execution of a warrant, (the officer was unable to recall from which
operation it may have been seized) that he placed the drugs in his jacket for
“safekeeping” while he went to the bathroom and that the package of crack must
have inadvertently separated from the rest of the drugs. The manner in which
this evidence was handled violated numerous regulations, yet neither the
officer, nor the supervisors overseeing the operation, were disciplined or
transferred out of the Narcotics Bureau as a result of this incident.
been seized and placed on a property receipt,
resulting in the discharge of the felony narcotics arrest. The officer’s
supervisor was notified that the drugs had not been submitted to the
Department’s Chemistry Lab the day after the arrest and seizure. Several months elapsed and the supervisor
made no further efforts to follow up on the missing narcotics. The officer and supervisor were reprimanded.
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS
Confidential Informants (“CI’s”) are integral investigative tools who are regularly utilized by the Narcotics Bureau.* However, because a CI’s identity must be carefully guarded for his or her safety, their existence and credibility are not easily subject to independent verification. Therefore it is absolutely essential that there are stringent regulations guiding the use of CI’s and that they are rigorously enforced.
In the 39th District scandal, officers routinely fabricated the information allegedly provided by CI’s regarding illegal drug activities as the basis for establishing probable cause to obtain search warrants. The illegal acts of these officers went undetected, in part, because the Department did not have the necessary procedural safeguards in place to guard against such abuses.
Since the 39th District scandal, the Department devised numerous policies to ensure the integrity of CI’s in narcotics enforcement operations. For example, the use of CI’s in narcotics is restricted to the Narcotics Field Units, thereby allowing greater control and oversight. Monthly audits of the funds used to compensate CI’s are conducted by the Quality Assurance Bureau to assure that the money utilized is properly reconciled. Additionally, the Integrity Control Office (“ICO”) of the Narcotics Bureau is required to collect information regarding CI activities.
Despite these important oversight measures, the IAO has found that, until very recently, supervision and monitoring of CI’s has been marginal.
During 2000, at the request of the IAO, the Integrity Control Unit of the IAB conducted a preliminary audit of Narcotics Bureau CI files which represents the only independent audit/study of CI’s that the IAO could locate. The following deficiencies regarding the management and oversight of CI’s were noted in that audit:
· The maintenance of some CI files were haphazard and sloppy.
· Some CI’s had never been properly identified.
· Some active CI’s did not appear in the ICO database and were thus not properly registered with and monitored by the Department.
· Police contacts with the CI’s were not always listed in the CI database. In fact, the IAO discovered that the ICO was never provided the reports of
__________________
* Confidential Informants are generally individuals engaged in a lifestyle that gives them access to criminal activities, evidence, and/or persons that would otherwise be difficult for police to access and are used and compensated by law enforcement agencies to assist in investigating certain criminal activities.
nearly three hundred CI/officer contacts. Despite repeated and futile efforts
of the ICO to enforce policies regarding the timely submission of these reports, no narcotics officer or supervisor has been disciplined for failing to comply with Departmental CI reporting policies.
· Some CI initiation forms did not have the commanding officer’s authorizing signatures as is required by Departmental policy, thereby making it impossible to determine whether a commanding officer actually approved of the use of the CI.
· Numerous active CI’s had outstanding criminal bench warrants (one CI had five outstanding bench warrants). In one Field Unit alone, twenty-seven of the active CI’s had outstanding warrants for narcotics offenses, theft, robbery, aggravated assault, and prostitution.
· In numerous cases, active CI’s were on probation/parole yet their probation/parole officers had not been notified of their CI status as required per Departmental policy. Some of these CI’s were on probation/parole for narcotics convictions and were not permitted to associate or interact, in any manner, with criminals and drug dealers. Their cooperation with the Narcotics Bureau thus constituted a material violation of the conditions of their probation/parole.
· Despite the fact that Departmental guidelines mandate Quarterly Reviews of the CI files, none had been conducted prior to the Integrity Control Unit audit.
As part of this study, the IAO reviewed approximately seventy-five search warrants and supporting affidavits that documented the use of CI’s as the basis for establishing the requisite “probable cause” to obtain the warrant. Pertinent CI records, contact sheets, and signed informant fee voucher forms were then examined to ensure that the facts and allegations described in the affidavits of probable cause were supported by CI records. In general the CI records and reports supported and confirmed the statements in the affidavits of probable cause. However the following issues should be noted:
When a CI is first activated, he/she is required to provide two signature cards that are maintained in his/her confidential CI file. Upon completion of services for which the CI is compensated, he/she is required to sign the Payment Voucher Forms. This enables comparison of both the CI’s voucher and file signatures to insure that the CI’s are actually providing the services and being compensated as reported by the narcotics officer. With the exception of the officer’s word, this signature therefore represents the main evidence that the CI was utilized as stated.
In several of the files audited by the IAO, the CI’s file signature cards were in script and the CI’s payment voucher signatures were printed and so dissimilar as to preclude verification. Additionally, some Voucher Form signatures appeared to be very different from the file signature cards. The IAO is not suggesting that improper conduct occurred in these cases. However, these dissimilar signatures are problematic and also raise questions regarding the degree of meaningful supervisory review of confidential informants.
This problem of script signatures versus printed names would be easily avoided by requiring that newly activated CI’s provide both on the signature cards for future comparison purposes. CI files and the vouchers should also be reviewed on a regular basis to ensure compliance. Additionally CI payment voucher forms are not monitored and can be freely obtained in bulk by narcotics officers. This would allow an officer to ask a CI to simultaneously sign several blank voucher forms. While the IAO has no evidence that such a practice is actually occurring, the Department should devise procedural safeguards with regard to the dissemination of these forms.
Since the Internal Affairs
audit, the Narcotics Bureau has implemented some remedial measures related to
management of CI’s. More rigorous
procedures for activating CI’s have been adopted. Narcotics officers and supervisors continue to conduct the
initial background investigation and debriefing as mandated per Directive 15. However, there is now a subsequent review by
the Narcotics Bureau Integrity Control Office to ensure total compliance with
pertinent Directives.
Additionally, Quarterly
Reviews of CI files are being conducted as of 2001. However, the IAO found
these reviews to be inadequate. Various
supervisors within each Narcotics Field Unit are charged with completing the
Quarterly Reviews, and each supervisor follows a different format. The Quarterly Reviews consist, in their
entirety, of a criminal record checks of active CI’s to ensure that they have
not been arrested or are wanted on outstanding bench warrants. (One narcotics supervisor took the added
step of checking for outstanding “Protection from Abuse Orders” against active
CI’s.) Some Field Units maintain the
Quarterly Reviews reports in a separate file, while another Field Unit maintain
each CI review in each CI’s individual file which precluded easy access and
review of these reports.
If a CI was terminated, the
reasons provided were generally vague and uninformative. For example, the most commonly stated reason
for a CI’s termination consisted, in its entirety, of the following: “As a
result of my assessment, I request the following CI be terminated”. This explanation is of little use if
consideration is given to reactivating the CI at some future time, or in
assessing the credibility of the CI’s prior services.
The Department stipulates
that “Sign out logs will be maintained indicating the date, CI folder #, time
in and out, and signature of the individual reviewing the file”. CI review logs were implemented this year
and, in the majority of the files reviewed by the IAO, the logs were
blank. This too raises questions
regarding consistent supervisory oversight and review of CI’s. Additionally, Departmental policy also
requires that immediate supervisors meet, when practical, at least once with
each CI utilized by narcotics officers under their command. The IAO could find
no evidence that these meetings occur.
(DEA policy requires that one-third of all active CI’s, and ten percent
of inactive CI’s are independently interviewed every eighteen months by IAB
investigators.) These practices are
further evidence of lax monitoring and oversight of CI’s.
(Note: See
Appendix C which documents remedial measures initiated by the Department to
address problems pertaining to confidential informants identified in this
study)
Confidential
Informant’s and Controlled Narcotics Buys
In accordance with Departmental
policy: “Where a CI is to participate in an undercover purchase in which he/she
may come in contact with either official funds, controlled substances . . .
he/she will be thoroughly searched by two officers of the same sex, both before
and after the undercover encounter and where possible, kept under continuous
observation to preclude questions as to the validity or integrity of the
evidence. The approval of the
supervisor of the officer operating the CI will be obtained prior to
participation in an undercover operation.”
It is difficult to assess
the degree to which these procedural safeguards are actually followed. Most police reports reviewed by the IAO that
documented the use of CI’s contained “boilerplate” and imprecise language that
virtually mirrored the Directive language and provided no specific facts regarding
the circumstances of the undercover operation.
Important facts such as how, when, where, and who conducted the “before
and after searches” of the CI, approximate locations of officers during their
“continual observation” of the CI, and which supervisor approved of the
undercover operation were notably absent.
For these reasons, it is virtually impossible to independently verify
whether the officers in fact followed Department policies.
Since these CI regulations
are designed to insure the integrity and credibility of evidence provided by
CI’s, they must be strictly enforced and the officers and supervisors should be
held strictly accountable for failures to follow protocol. The latter does not always occur. In an important IAB investigation described
earlier in this report, nearly every procedural safeguard required for using a
CI was intentionally ignored, and the circumstances surrounding the incident
were falsified. The involved officers
and supervisors received minimal discipline and are still assigned to the
Narcotics Bureau.
In another incident described earlier, a narcotics
supervisor surreptitiously met with and compensated a civilian who was
providing information on narcotics sales.
This alleged “confidential informant” was never registered or approved
by the Department, nor were any of the contacts and payments documented or
approved. This supervisor has not been
disciplined and remains in the Bureau.
THE ENFORCEMENT OF NARCOTICS LAWS
AND CIVIL
RIGHTS
Assessing the degree to
which narcotics officers adhere to legal and constitutional standards when
conducting detentions, frisks, searches, seizures, and arrests is critical to
any study of narcotics enforcement activities. It is incontrovertible that officers do violate civil rights in
the enforcement of narcotics laws (or any laws for that matter). Evidence of such misconduct is found in the
IAB investigations and civil rights lawsuits where allegations of excessive
force, and illegal detentions, searches, and arrests are documented and
proven.
As part of this audit, the
IAO reviewed several hundred randomly selected arrest files from the Narcotic
Field Units and the Narcotics Strike Force to determine whether they
articulated sufficient facts and the proper legal basis to justify the police
actions. Overall, the arrests reports
and search and seizure warrants contained in these files presented sufficient
legal basis for the police actions.* The IAO discerned no evidence of commonly
employed phrases or language, or frequently repeated and similar fact patterns which
would be indicative of questionable police practices.
_____________
* One
area of concern that became evident during this review pertained to “Consent
Searches”. The consent to search is one of the few
legally recognized exceptions permitting law enforcement personnel to search a
person or property without a search warrant. However, extremely strict
procedural guidelines have been established by both the Courts and the
Department to ensure officers do not use consent searches as an expedient means
of circumventing the warrant process.
The IAO reviewed several arrest files where
suspects allegedly consented to a search of his/her person, vehicle, or home -
however only one of the files contained a consent search form that had been
signed by the suspect. None of these
files or reports detailed the circumstances surrounding the consent, or whether
the numerous procedural safeguards were followed.
The Narcotics Bureau does not maintain
copies of executed consent search forms in any centralized location, does not
collect data regarding consent searches, does not enforce the requirement that
consent forms be attached to the arrest report, and does not conduct
investigations or inquiries into alleged consent searches to determine whether
the consents to search were obtained within legal and Departmental guidelines.
The issue of consent searches warrants full
review by the Department. (Note: See Appendix D which documents remedial
measures recently implemented by the Department to address problems related to
consent searches.)
The IAO recognizes that this
method of evaluating the legitimacy and constitutionality of officers’ actions
is of limited value. Many
officer/citizen interactions occur with little or no oversight or independent
observation, and civil rights
violations are generally not documented and therefore not subject to review or
scrutiny unless the affected citizen files a complaint or a lawsuit. It is therefore impossible for the IAO, or
any monitor for that matter, to compile reliable or verifiable statistics
documenting the extent to which civil rights violations occur.
A more productive avenue of
inquiry then is to examine the motivational and/or attitudinal factors which
may contribute to officers “cutting constitutional corners” in the enforcement
of narcotics laws. The IAO does not
regard the following inventory to be exhaustive as it relates to this inquiry:
1.
Philadelphia
police officers are rewarded in a variety of different ways,
based on an officer’s “activity/arrest” statistics. For example, the number of arrests an
officer makes is positively correlated with the amount of overtime pay an
officer can accumulate. This approach encourages the vigorous pursuit of
possible suspects for arrest and, at the same time, increases the likelihood of
carelessness or the tendency to “cut corners”.
It is therefore important to eliminate officers’ personal financial gain
as an incentive to enforcing narcotics laws.
(DEA agents beginning salaries are $45,000 to $46,000 plus guaranteed
twenty-five percent overtime.)
Additionally, assignments in
the Department, including the Narcotics Bureau, are also based in large part on
an officer’s “activity/arrest” statistics.
However this is a quantitative versus qualitative assessment. Thus officers with higher rates of arrests
that are problematic, weak, and ultimately thrown out in the courts, are
evaluated more favorably and have a greater chance of obtaining desirable
assignments than officers whose arrest rates are significantly lower, but the quality
of the investigation and arrest, and the rate of conviction are more
successful. Such heavy reliance on a
simplistic quantitative incentive system may have the unintended effect of
causing officers to become careless or prompting officers to cut corners.
2. The dysfunctional nature of the criminal justice system, and perceived
inequities in the bureaucracy of the Department, weakens officer morale and their commitment to the organizational values. Some officers with sincere desires to improve the quality of life in communities eventually feel justified in deviating from Departmental guidelines and legal standards to compensate for, and circumvent, a system that they perceive as unfair, capricious, hypocritical, and unsupportive of legitimate police work.
3. The social, economic, psychological, and health issues surrounding
drug trafficking and substance abuse are extraordinarily complex and cannot be resolved by law enforcement efforts alone. IAO interviews with police personnel have revealed that incessant and unrealistic political and community demands on the police to “solve” the drug problem compel officers to “do what it takes” to meet these demands and expectations – even if that requires circumventing the law or Departmental policies.
4. Given the subtle nuances of the laws pertaining to search and seizure, and the continually evolving legal standards pertaining to these legal issues, some narcotics officers and supervisors may not even be aware that some of their actions violate current legal standards due to inadequate training.
5. The Department’s failure to consistently and effectively address identified violations of policies designed to safeguard citizens’ civil rights sends the message that such misconduct is not regarded as serious, and may in fact be tolerable.