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Round 8
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Ted Redman
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Atlanta, Ga
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I noticed an error. An M203 grenade launcher is NOT mounted on a SAW. It is mounted under an M-16 (or M-4 nowadays).
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Mark Bowden
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Thanks and sorry for the mistake. We've fixed it.
MB
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Bill
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Monterey
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Mark,
Rather than a safety "strap" on a hand grenade, I think a
more accurate description would be a safety "clip". Out of
the box, grenade spoons (handles) are secured with both a
metal clip and the famous pin. Most units remove the clip
before going in to combat, leaving only the pin that must
be pulled prior to throwing. Please excuse my nit-picky
corrections. This is a fantastic series. I can't wait for
the book.
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Mark Bowden
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Thanks. I appreciate the help.
MB
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Karl Monger
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Wichita, Kansas
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From a former 1st Ranger Battalion officer - thanks for the incredible detail. We're hanging on a daily basis, waiting for the next installment. You've done a great job of showing how the "fog" of battle impacts on everyone and everything. Looking forward to natl broadcast...
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Mark Bowden
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Thank you. You guys are the experts. I'm depending on your help.
MB
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Monger
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Don't worry so much about the small errors or omissions - as in battle, it's always easier to critique after the action - especially if the person critiquing wasn't participating.
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Mark Bowden
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I'm not worried. I'm always chagrined to make a mistake, but given that I have no military experience, I'm bound to make some. And this series is giving me the chance to correct them! Thanks.
MB
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Monger
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May I also suggest a link for your Other Resources to the US Army Ranger Association Web Page:
http://www.ranger.org/~ranger/usara/usara.htm
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Mark Bowden
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Thanks.
MB
Other suggestions welcome. -- Online editor.
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Lou
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Killeen, Texas
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Mark, 3 quick comments: 1) Great work..i've read alot of mil history and yours ranks way up there. 2) Consider looking at the battle of Islandhlwana during the Zulu wars - Brit Regt was wiped out to a man -- often compared to Custer but in an African context.
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Mark Bowden
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Thanks, and I will.
MB
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tp
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ny,ny
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How many SEALS were involved in the battle, were they from
DEVGRU (ST-6) and did they participate in the taking down
the target building? Thanks again, and I look forward to
reading more.
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Mark Bowden
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I know it was SEAL Team Six, and I think it was four of five guys, but I may be wrong about that. They did not actually help storm the target building, but were in the thick of things throughout.
MB
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Lou
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Killeen, TX
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3) Marines had a plt of M1s in Somalia prior to Army arrival...talked to the plt leader and he was very impressed with their capabilities in the theather -- may be worth some research?. M1s are virtually immune to RPGs except a very lucky shot at the track. I have commanded both M1s and Bradleys-- Combine 4 M1s and a company of Rangers in a city and they are unstoppable. Bradleys are not tanks but would have had a major impact on operations. Comparing either M1 or M2 with a HMMWV is like a mac truck and a VW bug. Again Great Work!!!
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Mark Bowden
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Thanks. I'm going to let you guys who know what you're talking about settle this armor thing.
MB
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Ed Breen
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Bensalem PA
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Mark, thank you for bringing what really happens in war to
those who have not experienced it.I have three boys and I
will make it required reading,because all little boys want to be soldiers when they grow up. I want them to know that it
is not all a hollywood movie.Hoo-Raa
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Mark Bowden
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Thanks, Ed. I feel the same way about my boys. My 18-year-old left for Parris Island a few weeks ago with a rough draft of the whole thing under his arm. My nine and 11-year-old are reading it avidly. It is also interesting to me that the story is being appreciated by both military folks and pacifists. I have received several letters from Quakers who are pleased that the stories do not clean up and glorify combat. My job is to tell people what happened.
MB
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Bob Nance
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Napa California
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Mark, I have been flying helicopters for almost 30 years
including combat, at this time Im flying blackhawks for the
Natl.Guard. This profile of a tough mission is one of the
most vivid accounts of combat I have read. I hope people
keep this in mind when our soldiers are asked to fight and
the dangers that are out there.
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Mark Bowden
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Thanks, Bob.
MB
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Sam
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Coronado, CA.
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Mark, I don't know if you've clarified this yet as I was
unable to review the entire Q&A: "SEAL Sgt." No Sgts in
the Teams, only Petty Officers. PO2 being the Navy's
equivalent of a buck sgt. Great story. Cheers.
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Mark Bowden
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Yup, we got it. Thanks for pointing it out.
MB
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Sam
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Coronado, CA
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To "PK" in Philadelphia: When you've been in a firefight
comparable to that which took place in Mogadishu, then
you can come back talking about "murder". Until then,
STFU.
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MAJ Dave Armstrong
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Fairfax, VA
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Outstanding series. Glad someone recounts the incredible
bravery of our soldiers during this battle. Makes me double
my efforts as an Army intel officer.
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Mark Bowden
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Thank you, major.
MB
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jOHN
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INDY,IN
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WERE IS CPT STEELE TODAY
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Mark Bowden
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Major Steele is with the 82nd, I believe.
MB
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Proud2B
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American
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Thanx for a moving series, and telling the story of our nation's treasure. MB, any observations on the expanding role of the military in non-traditional roles, and its impact? Also interested to know your opinion of key politicians of this era who are only to happy to be in charge, but evaded their duty to their nation while others served?
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Mark Bowden
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I haven't thought much about the first question. So long as the other roles don't diminish the main capability -- that is, being able to fight and win -- I'd say it's OK. I do not strongly condemn those of my generation who tried to avoid going to Vietnam. It was a different time, and a dreadfully wrongheaded military venture. I was too young to be drafted into it, thank God, and I have nothing but respect for those who fought, but just as I would hesitate to criticize anyone's actions in a battle (having never been in one), I hesitate criticizing those who tried to avoid Vietnam (since I wasn't faced with the dilemma myself).
MB
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Mark Mondl
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Beavercreek, OH
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Note to Gordon from Ft Benning, GA. Please see my comments
in the forum.
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JPD
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Mechanicsburg, PA
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According to FM 9-13 an RPG 7 has a point initiating, base
detonating fuze. Anything can be changed in the field. My
comments are in regards to the weapon as manufactured. My
original point was to raise why anyone would question the
morality of our soldiers returning fire on the enemy when
the Somalis were firing everything they had at everything
they could. Hell, I'll bet more Somalis were casualties
from the back blast from the RPGs than our guys
justifiably wacked.
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Mark Mondl
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Beavercreek, OH
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Note to Gordon from Ft Benning. I tried to post to forum,
but failed. In short, my note contained quote from Col
David Hackworth. The comments are his. To see further
information concerning Col Hackworth's comments on Somalia
and Gens Garrison and Montgomery, go to www.hackworth.com
and see his comments under Vietnam Primer.
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Redleg
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Edison, NJ
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Vitto is right. Intimidation could have been vital. Skirts would have helped protect tracks of vehicles. Bottom line-Bradleys would have meant more protection and better projection of firepower than HUMVs. I differ with blame, though, lay it squarely on Les Aspin's shoulders. His entire Senate career was anti-military, I resent his appointment.
Thanks again to the Rangers and to Mark B.
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Mark Bowden
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You bet.
MB
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MAJ Lock
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Somerville, NJ
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Mark: Thanks for your response ref ‘shirking their duties’; it was what I expected. I would like to add, though, there is a real ‘danger’ with these type of forums—‘snippets of thought’—to be misconstrued, as my remarks were by ‘gordon of ft. benning, ga.’ "This man" does NOT at all believe that the Rangers shirked their duties and I don’t believe my question implies that. I’ve done considerable research on this battle, also, and I know that nearly every man involved in the firefight—Delta, SEAL, TF160, and Ranger fought with considerable bravery—and was scared to do so. The fact that some did not does not denigrate those who did, nor does it make those who did not cowards; and my questioning their actions is not a criticism of their conduct. I was not there and would never be so brazen to imply that anyone, to include me, would have done better. But there are lessons to be learned and questions need to be asked. There is more I’d like to say but I’ll leave it at that.
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gordon
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ft benning, ga
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Mr Bowden...Thank you for response. This is the kind of
clarification I and alot of the Rangers in this Regiment
were looking for. I don't mean to always sound negative but
everyone needs to realize, the people involved do worry
about the accuracy of what is being written. This does not
just refer to this battle but all the other ones this
regiment has been involved with in the recent past. To
respond to Monger's statement...do!!!worry about the little
omissions. This does effect the men who were there and it
does overshadow how they feel about themselves and their
actions during very trying and self testing times. Rest
assured, Karl, nobody here dislikes the drama of this story.
What they do have a heartache about, however, is the
misquotes, the train of thought, and the feelings expressed
in the article that reflects a one-sided decision making
process that leaves out the Rangers and elevates the d-boys.
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Mark Bowden
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I have had no one point out "misquotes" to me. If they do, I will fix them. I believe my account is accurate. As for trains of thought, they are drawn directly from the extensive interviews with the men themselves. Listening to some of the audio and video excerpts on this Web site will demonstrate in many instances how the statements by soldiers in interviews have been incorporated into the narrative. I have no desire to put words in anybody's heads or mouths, and labor not to. Where I have done so, I'd like to be corrected, and will be grateful for it.
MB
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G. FRAIK
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INT'L FALLS, MN.
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D. HACKWORTH'S HAZARDOUS DUTY DESCRIBES THE BATTLE OF MOGADISHU. DID YOU FIND ANY BASIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN YOUR STORY AND COL. HACKWORTH'S.
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Mark Bowden
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I think Col. Hackworth's overview of the facts is correct. He obviously had access to official accounts, timelines, etc. He is much quicker to reach conclusions about the facts than I am, but then he has better standing than I to do so. I will give his piece and the others that have been written about the battle a closer read and comment on each in more detail in the book.
MB
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gordon
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ft benning, ga
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Note to Mondl...Who die'd and made Hackworth God? Not
to belittle Hackworth's patriotism and proud service to this
country in two wars...don't you realize that he's out of
loop and has been out a long time?
Anybody who would make negative comments about a gnrl
officer of the caliber of Garrison or second guess his
planning and execution skills, obviously has a personal
agenda. This man was not picked to be the commander of the
unit he commanded just because his name is Garrison...he was
chosen based on his past performance as a tested COMBAT
LEADER! As a SR NCO, rest assured I have (as do alot of the
NCO's who have worked for him and with him) unquestionable
respect for him both as a commander and a well known
WARRIOR!!! To rely on Hackworth's Monday Morning
Quarterbacking is dangerous. Remember this man left the Army
because of his question of authority and Garrison represents
the authority he so disliked.
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Kent
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King of Prussia, PA
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A few comments: 1)Armor - When 13th MEU conducted a show of
force op several weeks after the battle of Mog we went with
a signifigant armor precence (see earlier posting). I during
that op I rode in my hummer (MRC-110), given what I new of
the battle at that time, I felt very reassured by the fact
that there were several M-1A's, Bradleys, Lav's, and AAVs in
our task force.
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Aimy
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Philly
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Mark, Have you been able to determine who is still a member of the helicopter unit they were in during the battle? Is that why they won't interview with you?
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Mark Bowden
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Many of the guys are still there. I think some were simply unavailable to be interviewed. They are busy defending the Free World. The series has opened up new interest and possibilities, and I hope to talk to more of these guys for the book.
MB
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Kent
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KOP, PA
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2)I think that Bradelys would have had a signifigant
psychological effect on the Somalis. This was evident to me
during our op. The gun is a porwerful symbol in their
culture, the bigger the gun the better, the more respect one
has. A few Bradleys that day would have represented the
biggest guns on the block. They would have thought twice...
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D.M. KENNEDY
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Thousand Oaks, CA
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Mark. Great series. And I don't mind getting slammed if it means a better debate! (For the record, I think that "no excuse, sir" is still a pretty weak excuse.) My question: I understand that the request for armor support was "slow
rolled" (14 day+ turnaround!) at the Unified CinC (Gen Hoar)
level, and that this lack of apparent urgency + a relatively weak endorsement from the CinC (CentCom) was evident when
the request finally made it to JCS/SecDef. Under
Goldwater-Nichols, the warfighting Unified CinC is given tremendous, almost independent warfighting authority and responsibility, yet very little attention has been directed
at Gen Hoar's failure to go to the mat, if necessary, to support his field commander, Gen Garrison. Have you run
across any information concerningthe Unified CinC's role/action/inaction in the issue of force protection?
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Mark Bowden
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Thanks. No. I've been up to my eyeballs here for the last three weeks. But these are important questions.
MB
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Win Stauffer
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Phila, PA
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The backlash from the Rnagers incident and more from the State Dept.'s ineptitude in coordinating with military personnel was felt in the lack of crucial action in Rwanda and Burundi. The multinational task force within the USLO compound was as close to incompetent as a military unit could get. The senior officers in coordination with State Dept. officials that planned the rangers mission should be crtitized for not using an American reserve force, such as the Marines use Force Recon, Direct action platoon, trailer platoons, as well as Sparrowhawk and Bald Eagle forces. Any US force should have been used, not the Pakistanis. The State Dept. must realize that once a military mission is planned, it is in the hands of the military and they need to take a backseat. This should be obvious with all the Non-combatant operations(NEOs) that occured within the past, i.e. Liberia.
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Kent
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KOP, PA
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3) Ranger/Delta interaction- From your account of the battle
one thing seems somewhat clear to me; for all their
experience, maturity, and skill, the D-Boys in gerneral
seemed to act in their own self interest. It seems to me
that because of their vaunted abilities they should have
been more stabilizing presence than they were. Instead it
would seem that they took a "hey, everyone else be damned.
We're going this way and if you want to come fine, if not
see ya". While you make mention in several places to some of
the good they did, I can only imagine the fracturing effect
their actions had on the cohesion of the younger Rangers.
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Mark Bowden
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So not everybody thinks I'm the PR man for the D-boys. Still waiting for that check in the mail ...
MB
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GEL
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Denver
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Outstanding work, however, check your naval rank terminology. There's no such thing as a SEAL SGT.
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Mark Bowden
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Yes, yes. I'm sorry. Really.
MB
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MD
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Alabama
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Was the CSAR Task Force pre-planned & able to respond immediately? What RESCORT acft were available (fast movers, apache's, UH-60 IDAP, etc). Were all services integrated into CSAR plan? Found your site late and haven't been thru it all yet, hope I'm not redundant. Absoluetly great work on your part.
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Mark Bowden
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Thanks. The CSAR element was on a single Blackhawk, and roped into crash site one. That was the only such force, and they had trained hard and were able to respond immediately. Beyond that there was only the Rangers left behind and, of course, the QRF, which was in a different chain of command. Nobody seems to have seriously anticipated two helicopters going down.
The attack aircraft on hand were the Little Bird gunships, the Blackhawks and the QRF's Cobras. I don't know what RESCORT means.
MB
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Delta John
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Bragg
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I think the guys are waiting around for each other to be the
first to get in touch with you. I get the impression that
it probably won't ever happen while they are in the unit;
however, several of the guys are moving-on very soon and
will probably do it then--like Steve did. I'll be out of
the net for a few. Thanks.
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Mark Bowden
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I hope so. The number is 215-854-2400. We'll miss you. Keep your head down.
MB
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Rick
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Raleigh NC
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David Hackworth has zero credibility.Remember, he was the
guy that predicted that the Blackhawks, Apaches, M-1 Abrams
tanks, and M-2 Bradley Armored Fighting Vehicles wouldn't
work during Desert Storm and that we would suffer 10,000
dead. I lost all respect for him when he got on CNN and said
that on the eve of the battle with our guys in the field.
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Action49
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Puzzle Palaceland, VA
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Extraordinary effort. I believe that you're providing a
service that will go far beyond the obvious. Doesn't seem
like ammo supply was a big issue--was it? How much did the
Rangers/Deltas take into battle? Were any units resupplied
during the battle? The discussion on the armor aside, were
there any other weapons that the troops would have liked to
have?
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Mark Bowden
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Ammo wasn't much of a problem, although the 99 guys at crash site one overnight ran low and were resupplied, very heroically, by a Blackhawk that braved withering fire, and then managed to limp back to base and land. Just one more example of stunnig bravery that will not make it into this newspaper series but will be described in the book.
As for weapons they would like to have had, I haven't heard much talk beyond the Bradleys, tanks and the AC130 gunship.
MB
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"Vitto"
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Charlottesville, VA
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Well I feel stupid. I just discovered the forum link at the
bottom of the left column. MB, should those of us who have
been using the Q&A page to vent our frustrations move to
that AO? RLTW! out.
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Mark Bowden
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You are welcome in both places. I'm trying to stay out of discussions where I have no place.
MB
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jimbo
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phila.pa.
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was there any mention of sgt.bill( the bull)o'connell in
this firefight.he talks alot about it at tony"s every thurs.
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Mark Bowden
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I haven't heard his name, but that sure doesn't mean he wasn't there. If he'd like to clue me in, he can reach me at 215-854-2400. Either that or tell me how to get to Tony's. I could use a drink.
MB
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N/A
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Washington, D.C.
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Would help round the story out to check out the official
accounts taken at the time.
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Mark Bowden
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I have. I'm sure I don't have all of them, but I have a lot. I did request from the Army, months ago, all of the accounts written by army historians. Even spoke to the man who compiled them. They refused. I managed to find quite a few on my own, but I'm always interested in more. My address here is, The Philadelphia Inquirer/400 N.Broad St./Phila. PA 19101.
MB
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Karl Monger
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Wichita, Kansas
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To Jose Gordon - if you're the SSG Gordon I served with in the 1/75 S3, give me a call @ (316) 734-3950 or e-mail @ kmonger@aol.com.
To Clay Othic - if you're still in Wichita, please also call me. Would like to buy you the beverage of your choice.
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SGT. J. A. Misnik
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Ft. Campbell, KY
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I am assigned to 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), and would like to know if you have any information on some of my Units activities during this time frame in Somilia. Thanks
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Mark Bowden
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I don't. Call me at 215-854-2400 and educate me. I'd be grateful.
MB
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